From
Mistreatment towards Anomie
Radicalization
and the Eclipse of Western Values
Totalitarianism
on Spotlight
ByDr.
Thomas Albert Gilly
Mistreatment, Minority and Radicalization
It has long since been argued that mistreatment
impacts the behaviour of human beings. In the criminological literature the
issue is discussed primarily within the general frame of youth delinquency and
youth radicalization. Also,
the topic is central to minorities. In that respect, the observation that the
mistreatment of minority groups came rapidly to the fore of the critical
criminal justice and criminal policy debate does not really come as a surprise.
Mistreatment may consist of segregation,
racism, hate, abuse, exclusion, suspicion, or simply lack of trust or
consideration.
The mistreatment of minority groups is
obviously relevant to the explanation of youth radicalization. History teaches
us that minority groups are predisposed towards mistreatment more so than
majority groups. This is so evident that sociological mainstream jargon and
public opinion automatically associate minority with mistreatment. The
equation: minority = a mistreated community is so deeply anchored in the
collective consciousness of the western world that almost all deviant and
criminal behaviour of members of minority groups tend to be perceived in the
public opinion and sociological mainstream discourse as a legitimate reaction
against mistreatment. As a result, the explanatory sociological discourse has
become increasingly supplanted by the “politically correct” comprehensive
approach to deviant and criminal minority group members. As far as such an
interpretation scheme is underpinned by moralizing complicity with people who behave
in a deviant or criminal way and by intellectual apologies for crime and
deviance related to minorities, it provides moral support for crime and
deviance
However controversial it may be, the transgression of
the law can never be legitimated in the name of morally just as a reaction
against exclusion and mistreatment. The respect of the law, in modern
democracy, is an absolute maxim.
Mistreatment is obviously an issue that is highly relevant to the explanation
of crime and deviance, namely crime and deviance within minority groups. And it
is obvious that mistreated youth, namely minority youth, are more predisposed
towards radicalization than young people who are well treated.
However, this is not really and innovative
think-tank.
Rather is it the complexity of the problem
which is involved:
(i) To what degree does mistreatment impact the radicalization of diverse
communities and within which of the diverse communities?
It could be that communities /minorities react
in different, or
even opposite ways,
to mistreatment. For argument’s sake, not all communities that are mistreated
react with radicalization and violence against the mistreatment. And
mistreatment is not specific to minority groups. We meet mistreated people in
almost all social groups.
Also, the members of a given community may be
mistreated by other members of the same community, although the same community is not mistreated
by other communities.
(ii) The Complexity of
victimization
Who are the victims then?
First of all, the mistreated community, namely the
mistreated minority and,
within minority groups,
the youth are victims of the mistreating majority, according to classical school. The second
category of victims consists of the majority group members, victims of the
violence used by the mistreated minority as a reaction against their
mistreatment.
But there are other cases that do not belong to
this classical scheme: For example, the acculturated minority elites may mistreat
the majority of the group. Mistreatment among minority youth is not necessarily
the result of minority mistreatment by the majority. There is not necessarily a correlation
between each, and the mistreatment amongst minority youth often varies as a
function of the development of a crime culture, regardless of and independently
from the real, supposed or irrelevant victim quality of the community to which
they belong. In other words,
this means that some minority youth may mistreat others belonging to the same community because of
the crime culture, not because of their membership in a mistreated (real or
supposed or even irrelevant) minority. It can not be asserted with certainty
that people, in particular minority youth who behave in accordance to the code
of crime culture,
are likely to consider what they do to the other as mistreatment, though the
way they behave is likely to be considered as mistreatment by people who are
foreign to the crime culture environment. And it is not certain either that the
victims of crime and violence in crime culture of youth minority feel as though
they are victims of mistreatment. Gang fighting within a specific minority
community or between different ethnic youth minority is a highly eloquent
issue.
As crime culture is an issue that is not
specific to minority and minority youth, the preceding observations apply
logically to majority groups
When entire majority groups or members of
majority groups become victims of crime and violence committed by minority
as a reaction against their mistreatment, it is then that the majority group,
in turn, may react with violence against the crime and violence of the
mistreated. They
may react because they themselves feel mistreated by the minority and in
general they consider themselves as mistreated, it is simply that they are not
likely to consider what they do to the other as mistreatment. .
(iii) Does the radicalization that results from mistreatment automatically
culminate in deviant, criminal and / or violent behaviour? Could it not be that
radicalization, to some point, impacts positively on collective behaviour?
(iv) Are terrorists mistreated minority people?
Supposedly, they are. The myth continues to be attractive for public
opinion, intellectual circles and mass-media. – Contra: The history of
terrorism teaches that the members of the terrorist board directory belong to
the acculturated political and intellectual elites of minority groups.
Are all young peoples
that are recruited in the Western World by terrorist organizations mistreated
people? Or is it rather anomie that favours minority youth predisposition
towards recruitment for and engagement in terrorism?
Minority, Acculturation and Anomie
This is a very important observation in that
the issue of being a minority can not be dissociated independently from the topic of
acculturation;
Acculturation is first and foremost and
genuinely a sociological topic. Does this mean that the topic of radicalization,
to be appropriately understood and/ or explained, requires a sociological or
even political perspective that completes the psychological framework of youth
radicalization?
This is certainly the most important problem.
And the challenge, which may be the most important one of our times, consists
in taking it up and trying to resolve it.
Here is not the place to take up this
challenge; and the problem which is involved can not be resolved either here.
Rather it is to be outlined.
Acculturation is the process by which members
of one cultural group adopt the habits, beliefs and the behaviour of another
group. Acculturation usually occurs in the direction of a minority group
adopting the habits and language patterns of a dominant group. Traditionally, this is the
paradigmatic meaning and the paradigmatic use of acculturation. However
acculturation can operate in the direction of the dominant or majority group
adopting the habits, beliefs and behavioural pattern of the minority group.
Acculturation does not mean assimilation.
Rather, it fits
within the concept of emancipation (the opposite of assimilation) in this
acculturated people or communities adopt the life style of the majority or
minority group without giving up the original culture.
Acculturation can, but does not necessarily
engender anomie.
Two hypotheses are to be distinguished:
-
The
paradigmatic meaning of acculturation:
Anomie
might occur within the minority group. The norms that are traditionally aimed
at goal achievement and value protection become frail and loose their genuine
nature. This assumes that the inherent norms of the minority group, during the
process of acculturation, remain, to a certain degree, relevant to the members
of the minority group, though they progressively lose their impact upon the
minority group’s social life. As long as the values and norms of the minority
group are strong enough to impact the group’s social life and organization,
there is little chance for anomie to develop. In other words, the better the minority
is assimilated (the disruption of the original norms and values), the more
anomie is involved..
Even in
the case of a complete assimilation, it is unlikely that the traditional norms
lose their relevance entirely to the members of the minority group. Rather, they remain, to a
certain extent,
alive in the collective consciousness of the minority group. In this hypothesis
anomie occurs as a result of an assimilation that remains underpinned by
traditional norms’ and values’ relevance for the minority group. The minority,
in this situation, is predisposed toward identity conflict rationalization, the
group tends to compensate the anomie as it is involved in its assimilation by
hyper-emphasizing the original values and norms that are still alive in the collective
mind, idealizing and radicalizing them. The process is central to the formation
of a radical and totalitarian ideology that may later serve as support for a
more radical call for their comeback and legitimate holistic and totalitarian
real-utopia.
-
The
non paradigmatic meaning of acculturation:
Anomie may occur within the dominant group. The
dominant group, due to globalization, social change and demographic factors,
increasingly adopts the norms and values that are traditionally foreign to its
social life and social organization. As a result the norms that have been aimed
to limit or to regulate goal achievement or to protect values within the
dominant group become frail and lose their genuine nature. Minority group norms
and values, but also norms and values that are relevant to non-western cultural groups
may be involved in the adaptation of norms and values that are foreign to the
dominant group.
Pluralism in Question?
The question which follows
then is: Is such a process to be interpreted as the reversal of pluralism? Pro
one may argue that pluralism holds for diversity and the coexistence of
different interests. As interests are determined by or embedded in norms and
values, pluralism covers normative and axiological diversity. Is it,
then,
that too much pluralism culminates with anomie in the majority group?
The answer is negative.
It is simply because the premise is false in that it refers to a theoretical
concept of pluralism that does not fit within the normative conception of
pluralism which is the only one relevant for democracy.
In modern democracy the
peaceful coexistence of different interests and axiological and normative diversity
are achieved within democracy’s fundamentals and through the means of the law
of majority.
It follows that pluralism
(with regard to diversity of interests, norms and values) presupposes,
according to the normative understanding of the term, democracy, that the
affirmation of diversity in modern democracy, is always respectful of the law
of the majority which is its expression and that the anomie that may occur in
the majority group is not the result of “too much pluralism”, but rather the
result of various processes (globalization, social and demographic change) that
impact negatively the fundamentals of modern democracy and that find in the
substitution of the theoretical conception of pluralism for the normative one
their ideological support.
Suppose
that the two extreme cases of anomie (paradigmatic and not paradigmatic)
operate simultaneously.
It follows logically that the norms that have
been traditionally relevant to the minority group lose their former impact, and
those that have been relevant for the majority are no longer capable of
regulation either;
There is hardly need to tell that there is
great need to test this hypothesis and its impact upon social control in modern
democracy by means of empirical research.
Acculturation and Islam. Western styled leadership elites and the masses
The question is as following:
To which degree do the preceding observations apply to
political leadership classes in Muslim culture?
The problem consists of the following
hypothesis:
-
Acculturation
(but not necessarily complete assimilation) that consists of copying the
western-styled life,
on the one hand.
-
Increasing the discrepancy between the
minority leadership elites who are copying the western norms and values and the
majority of the population that continue to organize their life in accordance
with the traditional values and norms, on the other hand.
-
The more obvious the anomic nature of the
Western World’s norms, the better is the risk for conflict and war:
Non western leadership's reaction
may consist of a
forced copying (that becomes increasingly artificial) and the majority may
react against the copy with radicalization and rejection of both the non
western leadership elites and the western culture. The second hypothesis is
that non-western
leadership elites engage in a return to the original values that might
culminate in the complete rejection of the western culture and in open
conflict.
.
The paradox is that
the predisposition of non-western
masses towards radicalization and reject of western values increases
proportionally to the reduction in western value' and the western
norms' power and efficiency.
Mimesis
The reject of Western values, within the
Western World, by minority groups and the reject of the western styled elites
of non-western
cultural groups by the majority of the population must be thought as of
mimesis;
The same observation applies to the two
variants of double-faceted
anomie:
-
Mimesis
with regard to anomie affecting the traditional norms of the minority group
during the paradigmatic acculturation in Western society (in particular when
acculturation culminates in assimilation), and regarding anomie that affects
the norms that are traditionally relevant for the non-western cultures during the process of
copying the western norms and values as it is operated by the western value-orientated elites of non-western cultural groups
and population.
-
Mimesis
with regard to the anomic nature of the norms that have been traditionally
relevant for the dominant groups in western society and regarding the anomic
nature of the copied Western norms at the level of the non-western minority leadership
elites.
The second hypothesis
requires a series of comments:
Anomie within the Western Society’s dominant group
Due to social, economic and demographic change
and globalization, the dominant group may adopt norms and values that are
traditionally foreign to its social life.
a) Anomie as the result of the non-paradigmatic
acculturation is the first variant of anomie rooted in social and economic
change and globalization; the disruption of democracy’s fundamentals as it is involved
in the clash of diversity (theoretical and normative conception of pluralism)
is the paradigm.
b) Anomie may develop through lack or
weakness of social ascent opportunities. The dissolution of both the
traditional proletarian class and the middle class into a common structure
where both are confused and wherein social ascent (from lower to middle class)
has lost much of its former relevance and attraction is central to this topic.
c) Anomie may result from the dissolution of the
traditional leadership elites.
Anomie within the western styled/ acculturated elites of the non-western
world cultures
b) is irrelevant in that the dissolution of
social class differences does not apply.
Anomie may occur within the western styled
Muslim leadership elites as an indirect effect of anomie and weakness of norms
and values in the western world. The more obvious the weakness and anomie in
the western world is the greater the risk of anomie. The model (that is copied)
loses its former attraction for the non-western leadership elites who no longer
trust it. As a result,
the copied values and norms become increasingly frail. The elites’ reaction may
consist of disengagement with the consequences and effects that have been
already outlined.
A more optimistic viewpoint consists of arguing
that the return to the original cultural norms and values may be associated
with a constructive renewal of the latter. The process may be considered as
positively in that it tends to compensate or prevent the risk of anomie and to
provide for an alternative model.
However, the most important problem which is
involved here consists of the following question:
The Alternative: Theocratic Fascim
Is it possible to imagine the constitution of a
new elite that, given the new axiological and normative framework of the
elites’ constitution, must necessarily engage in the process of acculturation
by which the former leaders adopt the norms and values that are shared by the
majority of their population?
What is the nature of such a non-western model? Does such
a model exist? And is the non-western, namely the Islamic world, capable
of developing a model of society that can be considered as a real and viable
alternative to the western model and that is capable of peaceful coexistence
with the latter?
One may argue that such a model exists.
Only the future will provide the answer to the
question of whether a mix up of tradition, religion and western values is
capable to develop as a real alternative to Islamic totalitarian politics.
This observation being put beside – apart from
the project that is aimed at the building of the totalitarian and fascist
Islamic World Theocracy, there is no alternative to the Western value and norm
system. And there should not be one either..
Fundamentalist and totalitarian therapy
The totalitarian and
fascist building of the World Islam society is a “real utopia” in that its
therapeutic effects provide support for and legitimacy to the totalitarian
politics of religion
Who is in therapy?
-
The Majority of the populations of
the Arab world. The Islamic theocratic fundamentalist therapy consists of
overcoming and rationalizing the deception and disappointment within the Arab
world about the failure of the Pan Arab Nationalist utopia.
-
The anomic Muslim and Arab youth
minority in the western world. The therapy consists of legitimizing the
rejection of Western norms and values, granting a world mission rooted in
responsibility to the youth and reconstructing their personality by means of
indoctrination and hate education. Recruitment for terrorism is the result.
-
The anomic leadership elites of the
Islamic world. The therapy consists of offering an alternative way and of
compensating the weakness of trust in western norms and values by promising the
establishment of a new Islamic world elite that is no longer the slave and the
victim of post-colonialism.
-
The leftist intelligentsia of the western
world. The therapy consists of rationalizing the colonization and imperialism
complex and in rebuilding the outrunning ideological conflict of the past
through human rights. The motto: “The fight for social justice and equality you
are fighting is always relevant. We are engaging in the same fight. Join us”.
Outlook
Suppose the therapy is successful. It is then
that the western civilization is likely to regret the catastrophe of the last
century. This is the opinion of one of the most prominent philosophers in
Solution
On all of these accounts there is one solution, and it is the only one. The catastrophe problem
solution consists in rebuilding the force of and the trust
in western values and norms. The call for the return / renewal of western norms
and values is the call for the counter-offensive that is aimed to put to death
the nonsense of the reality show that stages apocalyptical politics of
religion.
The theocratic fundamentalist therapy is
motivated by hate; it is aimed at conflict and division. The final catastrophe
is central to the fundamentalist “world project” in that the final catastrophe
is staged as an apocalypse that will restore the collapsed harmonious and
peaceful unity between human beings and divinity by prompting the victory of the
divine essence’s sense of a world which has become senseless through a lack of the original
unity. The staging of the Islamic apocalyptical “Weltbild”, however attractive
it may be for the clients of the therapy, suffers an internal contradiction: As
the apocalypse is central to therapy, the former is no longer an event, rather, it is a program, and
this program is a political program.
Obviously, the topic of apocalypse is central
to all sorts of real utopia. As far as therapy is involved as a precondition, the
latter provides for the construction of the lost unity that is to be restored
by the apocalyptical event. The therapeutic effect culminates in the complete
assimilation, of the “Weltbild” at the level of the collective consciousness,
wherein human being’s condition and essence, through lack of the original
unity, is rooted in and denoted by violence and conflict only.
The Islamic fundamentalist therapy stages as
reality show the catastrophe it promises to resolve in an apocalyptical manner.
Apocalypse as a program -that’s the fundamental difference. This reality show lives on the production and
reproduction of mimetic violence and conflict only. Metaphorically, but truly:
This sorts of mimesis
precludes the rationale of mimesis as it is documented in the Hebrew
Scriptures: The twin tale’s morals consists in teaching us that Esau is not
Jacob, not because the former is genuinely evil, but because he is not willing
to engage in the mimetic process that would let him become Jacob.
The Islamic fundamentalist “Weltbild” has
nothing better to offer than the mimesis that consists of copying and
reproducing Esau ad infinitum.
In this account, the rebuilding of western norms and values
holds for the reinforcement and reconstruction of the mimesis as it is defined
by the Hebrew Scriptures. And this mimesis is the only mimesis that offers
human being protection against the evil one that consists copying and
multiplying Esau..
The more the western
values are trusted and strong, the better is their predisposition towards
adoption, and the better their
impact upon catastrophe prevention around the world. That’s why the call for
the comeback or the reinforcement of western culture as it lives in the Hebrew Scriptures
and the Greek classics is foremost relevant to the western world. Weakness
prompts the catastrophe.
The Challenge
The challenge we have to face and to take up
consists of promoting a viable and universally valid dominant western value and
norm system within an environment that, due to globalization and communication,
tends to supplant prerogatives of value and norm setting by an equal
distribution of value and norm
setting competence. In such an environment, vertical and hierarchical power and
competence are increasingly paralleled by horizontal and centrifugal power and
competence structures. These horizontal and centrifugal structures tend to
undermine the traditional “majority / dominant – minority / dominated social
ontology. For argument’s sake, Globalization and communication favour the reciprocal and
simultaneous transfer of knowledge, culture, habits, beliefs and even norms
across the world. Also note,
it favours the
simultaneity of the reciprocity (the paradigmatic versus the non-paradigmatic scheme) of
acculturation in the world. In the
global communication era all people are equal in that they are simultaneously
and reciprocally performers and receivers of the communicative speech acts, all
the more so as the communicative use of language supposes a reflexive
intention. Given that the intention’s fulfilment consists of its recognition,
it follows that all people who are involved in the communicative interaction
are theoretically and by definition equally capable of recognizing the intention
of the communicative act. Such equality tends to undermine traditional,
historically grown, communication / intention recognition competence
prerogatives and privileges anchored on and traditionally legitimated in the
name of specific national, cultural or even ethnic identity.
The problem that is involved here is as
follows:
The promotion of viable and universally valid
dominant western values and norms depends increasingly
upon the communicative rationale.
Discourse Ethics
constitutes the only
means to set up universally valid ethics’ norms. However, the limits of the paradigmatic use of
Discourse Ethics require the shift from a rational to an axiological foundation
of Discourse Ethics.
The Twin Tale: Jacob and Esau. Universal Ethics Against Totalitarianism
The observation that western culture is the
only culture that, by promoting the mimetic lesson of the twin tale, offers
world peace and protection of the peace in the world comes as support.
So as Esau is potentially capable to engage in
the process of mimesis that would allow him to be Jacob, so Jacob is capable to
take Esau as his most certain defender and soldier.
It is by virtue of this mimesis only that Esau,
the hunter and warrior – the man of action, becomes capable to act in a
meaningful and ethically desirable manner. Hunting and war become meaningful
and ethically desirable when it is aimed at the protection and the defence of
ethics and spirituality as they are according to the twin tale, incarnated in
Jacob. The profane and material world that is represented by Esau is meaningful
only if it exists as a function of Jacob (ethics and spirituality).
But this assumes that there is a common place
to meet for both, Esau and Jacob. To be a function of Jacob, Esau must be
involved in Jacob’s spirituality and morals;. But he can be involved only if
Jacob confronts his spirituality to the material and profane world. Without this confrontation, Esau is
not able to accept the mimesis offer. And Jacob’s ethics do not reach practical
relevance either.
Without
this common place, without this reciprocal involvement, each remains the prisoner
of dull and tasteless identity. As long as they do not meet and interact, their
difference is underpinned by the identity which consists of the reciprocity of
the other. The reciprocity of identification by means of the other (I am not
Jacob – Esau, I am not Esau – Jacob) precludes the development of the relationship
in that the former is determined by the maxim that each is always the other and
as the other,
the same.
If
both are the same it is then that each of them is very likely to compare the way
in which the other’s behaviour is considered and evaluated by society, of how
it impacts society. This scheme precludes differences
in consideration and evaluation and impact. In an environment where such a
scheme is at work people can not be respectful of the other’s difference
either. It is simply that the identity implies the reciprocity of total
identification. What is involved is the process by which each of both projects
his self-image on the other, so that the other is nothing but my projection.
Complete assimilation and finally the annihilation of the other’s difference is
the most important consequence in that the totalitarian nature of such a
process is definitively demonstrated.
Esau
is bitterly disappointed about Jacob, he is so angry about the way in which he is
considered and treated that he projects to kill him. He can neither understand
what happens to himself, nor can he accept that what happens to Jacob shall not
apply to him. He feels mistreated. It is that his projection on his brother –
his brother’s complete assimilation destroys the otherness of the other – his
twin brother.
That’s
why the mimesis as it is figured out in the twin tale is a unique masterpiece of
ethics,
both in regard to its anti-totalitarian morals and regarding totalitarianism
prevention. This anti-totalitarian ethics not only provides
an ethical lesson to humanity but it constitutes one of the most -perhaps the most-
important aspects of Judaism [i]Hence
the parentheses which is opened with the question: Why has Judaism never shaken
hands with totalitarianism?, is definitively closed.
The
common place – the point to meet and to interact consist of identity’s
non-identity – the otherness of the other. Mimesis is the means to reach this
common point: Esau’s potential capability of copying Jacob and becoming Jacob
implies that he is potentially Jacob, although he remains Esau. Esau’s identity
is fulfilled only by means and through the accomplishment of his non identity.
As
long as hunting and warship is not a function of ethics and spirituality, the former
is embedded in the totalitarian project that aims to destroy the latter. As
long as ethics and spirituality miss the confrontation with reality, ethics has
nothing better to offer than the ideological death threat to reality. Without ethics’
and spirituality’s confrontation with the material and profane, ethics’ ideological
deviance remains the most certain supporter and “herbivore” accomplice of the
“carnivore” hunter.
Western
culture has experienced both totalitarian extremes – the one that is rooted in the
ideological alienation of spirituality and of reason,
and the other one that developed as repercussion of the inherent chaos and violence
of nature.
But
the Western culture as it lives from the Hebrew scriptures is the only culture that,
by providing and promoting the mimesis - scheme as it is out-figured in the
twin tale, is capable of totalitarianism prevention and counter fighting.
And
it is the only one that is worthy of being defended with arms. And it is the only
one wherein Esau’s hunt and war is a legitimated hunt and war against the
violation of the twin tale morals (the unity in and through diversity) as it is
involved in the totalitarian and criminal enterprise where the ideological
rapist of reality and the naturalist rapist of spirituality act in complicity.
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[i]
For
argument’s sake,
this theme is central to other Torah sections. The children of a manner that is accessible for
human being, not in divine
language. If G’d would have listened to Moses and if G’d would have addressed
his commandments in his proper divine language, not only would no human being
have been able to get the message, but G’d by addressing the commandments in
his proper divine language would have treated the human being as himself. Such a
treatment, if it were applied, would be totalitarian in that G’d projects his
divine identity to human being, in that the children of Israel are altogether
little Gods. Analogically Yitro advises Moses to let the children of
The section that is dealing with Joseph and his
brothers is another eloquent demonstration of Judaism’s anti-totalitarian nature. Why isn’t
it Reuben who shall become the king of