Organised Crime : The Russian and World Perspective[1]
By Yakov Gillinskiy
Introduction
Despite
the numerous publications in the popular media and scientific literature (see Abadinsky 1994, Arlacchi 1986,
Block 1994, Kelly et al. 1994), the topic of organised crime remains difficult to
grasp. Organised crime constantly expands its spheres of influence. Crime
organisations seek access to state structures, attempting to influence the
economy and state policy. Criminal organisations have large resources and
extensive experience of cooperation with business, the economy, and the various
political parties. On the one hand, organised crime is a serious danger to
society; on the other, the strip ping away of the cloak of mystery and the
myths surrounding the mafia and organised crime is highly topical. This subject
is particularly important for
It
is impossible to single out any one reason for the extremely serious and
widespread crisis currently affecting Russian society. Much of it stems from
historical roots:
–
the lack of a democratic tradition;
–
– the nature of Orthodox as opposed to
Protestant religious ethics; and
– the centuries’ long tradition of despotism.
The
immediate source of today’s problems began in October 1917 with the unique
social experiment of forcibly establishing a social Utopia. (The slogan on the
gate of the Solovka labour camp read «Happiness To
Everyone Through Violence».)
The
attempt to build a Utopia was accompanied by an unprecedented process of
negative selection which saw those most proficient in their field being
repressed, exiled or destroyed, whilst the grey, mediocre (often criminally
minded) elements of society were championed. The repression of the people could
be compared with genocide.
This
eventually pushed the
– the disintegration of production and
the economy;
– the loss of trade skills;
– the deprofessionalisation
and dequalification of the majority of the working
population;
– the lumpenization*
of the people;
– the lack and non-development of a
middle class which might pro vide some kind of stable social basis;
– crises in the health, education,
transport and communication services and other service industries;
– a number of interethnic conflicts
resulting in large numbers of deaths;
– a series of political crises;
– crises in spirituality and morality;
– the increase in various forms of deviant
behaviour (crime, drug addiction, suicide); and
–
the growth of Mafiatype organised crime.
Gorbachev’s
Perestroika was a necessary attempt to save the power structures by way of
reform. A similar attempt was made by Khrushchev (the «Thaw»). However, every
attempt ended with the actual or political death of its propagators and was
followed by «Stagnation».
With
all due credit to Gorbachev, his reforms turned out to be the most radical,
although even these were not to be fully satisfactory. All the symptoms of
socioeconomic catastrophe mentioned above, remained untreated. Power is
continually returned to the ruling nomenklatura;
corruption, common to Russia, has taken on a monumental nature in all organs of
power and establishments; the militarization of economics and politics
continues; interethnic conflicts have given rise to further masses of deaths;
nationalist, antiSemitic and neofascist
groups have developed and meet no resistance (Laquer
1994). The criminal war in
The
country permits human rights abuses on a massive scale, particularly in the
army and those penal institutions where tyranny and torture dominate.
Confirmation of this may be found in the international research material
compiled by Amnesty International and also in domestic research (Abramkin 1996).
The
economic reform under way in
The
redistribution of property is being carried into effect not only by legal
means, but also by illegal ones (bribery, murders, threats).
Parallel
to this, there is the emergence of full scale unemployment and of parttime employment. The official unemployment rate in Rus sia is by no means very high:
1992: 4.7 % of the ablebodied population; 1993: 5.5
%; 1994: 6.3 %; and 1995: 7.7 %. Few have the official status of «unemployed»,
and only 0.5 – 0.7 % receive an unemployment allowance.
Several
points are to be noted: first, the Soviet people are not accustomed to
unemployment. Second, considerable parts of the able bodied population are only
partially employed (short working day, short working week, compulsory «leaves»).
Third, structural unemployment is growing. Fourth, the economic decline, a low
per capita income for the majority of the population, together with the
tendency towards a growth in the unemployment rate, result in a widespread
psychological fear of becoming jobless.
Technological
backwardness and the incompetence of the domestic production and service
sectors have manifested themselves in the course of the reforms. A consequence
of this is the inferiority complex of employees, their dequalification,
marginalization and lumpenization.
The
disintegration of the service sector and of the social infra structure have
entailed further difficulties for the population. There is a virtual neglect of
children and teenagers, the parents of whom are busy with the acquisition of
the means of subsistence; out of school centres are being closed because of the
lack of state financing, while private ones charge exorbitant fees that very
few can afford. With all this, the number of «temptations» (fashionable youth
clothes, audio and video appliances, sweets) has grown sharply, thus provoking
illegal means to acquire them.
Radical changes in the system of values and norms have
created a state of anomie (using the terminology of Durkheim).
Numerous mistakes and abuses committed by the country’s leaders while putting
the economic reforms into effect are accompanied by criminal developments:
corruption, incompetence, «nomenklatural»
privatization (a privatization in the course of which federal and local
functionaries – «nomenklatura» – lay their hands upon
stateowned property), etc.
The nature and extent
of organised crime
General
problems
Organised
crime is the functioning of stable, hierarchical associations, engaged in crime
as a business, and setting up a system of protection against public control by
means of corruption. Criminal associations are a kind of social organisation of
a «labour collective body» type. The growth of the organisational aspect of
crime is a natural process; it is a manifestation of the growth of the
organisational aspect of the social systems as well as of their subsystems (the
economy, politics, etc.). It is a worldwide process. The high degree of adaptivity of criminal associations (strict selection of
staff, strict labour discipline, high profits, etc.) ensures their considerable
vital capacity: «Mafia is immortal!»
The
members of the criminal gangs – professional criminals – are not heroes, but
neither are they the scum of the earth. These are people engaged in their own
businesses. Gary Becker, Nobel prize winner in economics, speaks about this in
the following way: criminal activity is just the same profession or trade as
joinery, engineering or teaching which people devote their time to.» (Becker
1987). It is chosen when the profit (the revenues minus the production costs)
exceeds that which legal occupations make.
Certainly,
what they do is not in line with the moral or the juridical laws of society.
Nevertheless, their activity is also aimed at satisfying social needs. Are we
always in a position to draw a distinction between legal and criminal
businesses abiding by the criteria of morality and legality? In Russia, it is
hardly possible. I consider that the three acknowledged models of organised
crime: i.e. the hierarchical; the local and ethnic; and the business enterprise
(Kelly et al. 1994: 78–87), complement each other. «Business enterprise» is the
content of the organised crime activities, whereas the hierarchical, local and
ethnic models reflect organisational sides of this activity. The literature
places emphasis more and more frequently on organised crime as a kind of
business enterprise (Abadinsky 1994, Arlacchi 1986, Block 1994, Kelly et al 1994).
The
criminal organisation (syndicate) building up a system of organised crime (industry)
is defined by the following indispensable characteristics:
– a stable association of people,
designed for long-term activity;
– the criminal nature of the activity;
– the deriving of maximum profits as the
key goal of the activity;
– the complex hierarchical structure of
the organisation with its functions delegated to leaders, supply and security
groups, experts, etc.;
– the corrupting of power bodies and law
enforcement services as the main means of criminal activity; and
– a wish to monopolize particular
spheres of activity or territories.
Criminal
organisations, like other social organisations, strive to exert influence on
the state power and to exercise control over it (through lobbying, bribery,
infiltration of their representatives into power structures, etc.).
The high efficiency of the business enterprises of
criminal organisations can be attributed to the fact that their «professional
selection» their «personnel selection» is done competently, and their «labour
discipline» is strict. The youngest, bravest, most enterprising people with the
greatest strength of character are involved. With the «pay for labour» offered
in organised crime, remuneration is several times higher than in similar
structures of the Russian police.
Organised
crime in Russia
Organised
crime in Russia after 1917 existed primarily in the form of gangsterism,
and later, since the 1930s, in a peculiarly well organised association of
«thieves-in-law». (A «thiefinlaw» is a professional
thief or swindler who has chosen crime as a permanent way of earning his
living, well-known in the criminal world, and obeying the «law of the thieves»,
a special code for criminals – and observing and protecting it in the prisons.)
Moreover, the «tsekhoviki» (groups within
professions) emerged in the 1950s; the merging of «teneviki»
(shady dealers) with state structures and the beginnings of institutionalised
corruption occurred in the 1970s; and the forming of Mafia type criminal
societies took place from the 1970s to the 1990s.
Criminal
organisations (syndicates) constitute the system of organised crime (as
industry). Three basic kinds of criminal organisations can be singled out in
respect to content: criminal (racketeering, narcotics trading, etc.); economic;
and political (terrorism, attempts to seize power).
The term mafia is widely used, although it is not
strictly scientific. In a broad sense the word «mafia» serves as a synonym for
«criminal organisations». In a narrower, more specific sense, it refers to a
criminal association, which is characterized by a high degree of organisation
and hierarchical structure, and which resorts to force in order to attain its
goals.
Three
levels of criminal organisations exist: first, a criminal group; second, a
criminal organisation or association; third, a criminal community. For
instance, there are in St. Petersburg four criminal communities of the mafia
type (the so-called Tambovs, Azerbaidzans,
Chechens, and Kazans), some dozens of criminal
associations (for example, Komarovs), and hundreds of
criminal groups.
The
Centre of Deviantology of the St. Petersburg Branch
of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences has, since
1993, been involved in a criminological study into the black market economy and
organised crime. Business in St. Petersburg and other regions of Russia is
divided among the mafia communities. Excellent ly
organised informational services enable them to track and monitor all the
commercial structures, and the moment when a new commercial structure begins
making a profit, it arouses the interest of mafia groups. As one businessman
interviewed asserted: «100 % of commercial structures are embraced by racket...
Racketeering penetrates all the enterprises except those of military industrial
complexes and some foreign firms.»
There
exist two levels of racketeering: tribute money extracted from small kiosks and
that obtained from commercial organisations. In the latter case, besides
outright extortion of tribute («black rack et»), one can distinguish various
indirect, disguised types: payments for «guarding», for «rendering services in
the field of marketing» in compliance with the contract for «cooperation», or
for «services» (for example, recovering debts).
The
«taking care» by the mafia of commercial structures includes having their
representatives on the administrative and managerial bodies. One cannot object,
because first, the criminals have power, and second, who else can force a
debtor to pay, even with the decision of the arbitration court on hand?
Our
informants commented as follows on the contemporary situation: «0ne cannot do
without illegal dealing»; «legal and illegal methods are interlocked^ etc.
Heads of the special police units sup port these views: «The average
businessman is extremely involved in crime... One has to bribe for
everything... The debts have to be re covered by resorting to force... One
cannot deal with taxation inspection without a bribe»; «A bribe is an
inevitability in the sphere of business... Tax inspection is highly
corrupted... Mafiosi, not infrequently, can be found among members of the
boards of banks.» Based on information from our informants, we are in a
position to single out the typical situations where businessmen are forced to
commit crimes.
First,
one has to bribe in the following situations: when registering businesses, when
renting premises from state bodies, when acquiring licences for their
utilisation from state bodies, for obtaining low interest bank credit, when
reporting to tax inspectors, when completing customs formalities, etc.
Second,
one has to conceal revenues, since with the current taxation rate amounting to
80–85 %, one cannot survive in competition with other firms if one honestly
reveals all revenues.
Third,
most of the state owned business enterprises operating under current conditions
find themselves «under the protection» of gangsters (mafia): They are «guarded»
by some gang against other gangs and have to pay «tribute» for that and render
(obligatory) services. In particular, mafia include their «representatives» on
councils of directors, boards of business enterprises, organisations and banks.
Thus, legal and illegal business merge.
Fourth,
the rigid normative regulations in some kinds of economic activity and the
absence of such regulations in other fields result in businessmen ignoring the
law in some cases, and making their own «laws» in others.
Fifth,
the synthesis of legal and illegal elements in the country’s economy engenders
such absurdities as fake goods and services, and forged securities.
The main fields of activity of criminal organisations
in St. Peters burg and Russia are: bank speculations (shady transactions);
fictitious real estate transactions; stealing and reselling cars; illegal ex
port of nonferrous metals; black-market transactions relating to humanitarian
aid» (bribing city functionaries for a wholesale purchase); production of and
traffic in fake hard liquor; arms sales; counterfeiting money. Furthermore,
control over gambling, agencies for supplying sexual services, and narcotics
businesses is taking shape.
In
the years 1995–1996, the Centre for Deviantology has
had a number of interviews with representatives of the criminal world (Y. Kostjukovski). In the course of the interviews, a tendency
for criminals to develop their professional skills has come to light.
Hi-tech
crimes are connected to computer engineering, such as bank frauds, but new
technologies are also used in such prosaic areas as the falsification of alcoholic
beverages, the manufacture of drugs, the theft of automobiles, or the
development of new weapons. To some extent it is possible to show that new
developments in the field of computer engineering initially pass through
criminal structures. Growing attention is being given to attracting scientific
staff (chemists, programmers, economists, and lawyers), who today are engaged
in criminal business.
The
narcotics business is one of the least visible, well-established forms of
organised criminality in Russia. The police are not able to uncover the leaders
of the Russian narcotics mafia and only succeed in catching drug consumers or
ordinary distributors (the lowest level of the narcotics mafia). Only by
indirect indicators can we estimate the activity of criminal organisations in
the sphere of the narcotics business, such as when the police or the customs
capture large quantities of narcotics, or when examining the world wide web of
drug distributors, or by looking at the revealed ways of drug transportation
and drug traffic through the territory of Russia. The struggle against the
narcotics mafia is complicated by widespread corruption within the law
enforcement and power organisations and the political games Russia plays with
the countries which export drugs (Azerbaidzan, Chech nya, and the nations of
Middle Asia).
The
Mafia displays a keen interest in privatization. As one of our respondents put
it: «Their goal is to take hold of real estate.» They obtain information about
forthcoming auctions, come to the auctions with their armed men and decide who
buys what property and at what price. Active rivals from legal business are
requested to abstain from buying in order to avoid trouble.
More
and more information is also becoming available on the lobbying of some
representatives of state bodies by the mafia.
Consequently, we confront a criminalization of
business in combination with an economization and a politicization of crime.
Finally,
some official data on organised crime in Russia: Criminal organisations
committed 23,820 crimes in 1995; the number of such organisations uncovered by
the police has grown as follows: 785 (1990), 952 (1991), 4352 (1992), 5691
(1993) Yet, organised crime is for the most part invisible.
Comparative
evaluation of various measures against organised crime, including legislation
to combat organised crime
The
measures applied in combating organised crime have varied in step with the
changes in the forms of organised crime.
In
the years 1918–1921, banditry or gangsterism (established
criminal groups committing murders, robberies and other serious crimes) was
combated by the revolutionary and military tribunals, and also by bodies of the
VChK (the AllRussia Extreme
Commission), which was authorized to impose direct punishment (including
execution). Noncourt punishments were applied widely
and harshly.
In
the Criminal Codes of the Russian Federation for the years 1922 (Art. 76), 1926
(Art. 59/3), 1960 (Art. 77), banditry meant the organisation of armed gangs for
the robbing of businesses, establishments, organisations, transport services,
or citizens, and also referred to participation in gangs and robberies
committed by them.
In
the criminal legislation, the most severe measures of punishment were provided
for banditry (gangsterism): The Criminal Code of 1922
(Art. 76) imposed execution with confiscation of property, while the presence
of mitigating circumstances reduced the sentence to deprivation of freedom for
a term of not less than three years with strict isolation, and confiscation of
property; Art. 59/3 of the 1926 Criminal Code authorized deprivation of freedom
for a term of not less than three years, with confiscation of property and
harsher punishment in aggravating circumstances up to execution, with
confiscation of property; and Art. 77 of the 1960 Criminal Code imposed
deprivation of freedom from three to fifteen years, or capital punishment with
confiscation of property.
In
all the criminal codes, crimes committed by groups were grounds for increased
punishment.
However,
although phenomena that by their character, their forms of organisation and/or
kinds of activity revealed them as group criminality, they often did not fall
under the formal legal concepts of «gang» or «group». Also, judicial punishment
and noncourt reprisals primarily pursued the
political ends of the Soviet totalitarian state. On the other hand, from the
moment of the proclamation by the country «winning socialism», the practice of
applying Art. 77 of the Criminal Code stopped («there is no banditry in a
socialist state!»).
The
struggle against the earlier mentioned «thieves-in-law» was also conducted in
non-judicial ways. During the Second World War, many «thieves-in-law»
participated under the threat of execution or for patriotic reasons in the war against
Fascist Germany. When demobilized, the majority of them were, sooner or later,
imprisoned again. But as persons having «cooperated with the authority», they
appeared as «traitors» of the thieves’ tradition, of the «law of the thieves»,
as so-called «bitches» (a word that is used as a curse or insult).
The
penitentiary administration used this fact and provoked «the war of bitches» in
all camps of the GULAG archipelago. In this bloody war, very many old and new
thieves were lost. For some time, their number was sharply reduced. But,
obviously, this did not «liquidate» organised crime.
In
the 1960s and 1970s, stable crime groupings were built up from existing
«thieves» (professional criminals), and «tsekhovikis»,
«tenevikis» (white collar criminals) and were based
on corruption in the government and the police, including the top leadership of
the Communist Party of Azerbaidzan, Georgia, Kazakh,
Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Moscow, etc. as well as the highest level leaders of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.
The
attempt to struggle against the new forms of organised crime was undertaken in
the years of government by Yu Andropov (1983– 1984) and continued under M.
Gorbachev. Police, the prosecutor’s office, and courts were authorized (!) to
investigate and to consider criminal charges against some of the highest
officials, others were dismissed, and some committed suicide (for example, the
former Minister of Internal Affairs USSR, General N. Schelokov).
From
the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, Russian society has
become increasingly aware of the economic, social, and political dangers of
organised crime. However, the struggle against it appears to be tortuous.
First,
well organised criminal communities have developed, se curing their operations
by the corruption of power structures and law enforcement bodies.
Second,
time has been wasted on long, empty discussions concerning the theme, «Is there
organised crime in Russia?»
Third,
the legislative base. Criminal law has proved inadequate for successfully
countering criminal organisations. The laws «On Combat ting Organised Crime»
and «On Combatting Corruption» were adopted by the
Russian Parliament only recently. And the Decree of the President of the
Russian Federation (No. 1226 of June 14, 1994) «0n urgent measures for the
protection of the population against banditry and oth
er manifestations of organised crime» is in
contravention of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. (This is confirmed
by the resolution of the Federal Assembly of the Parliament of the Russian
Federation of June 22, 1994 «0n the protection of the constitutional rights and
freedom of the citizens in the struggle against criminality».)
The
new Criminal Code, adopted by Parliament and signed by the President, came into
effect on January 1,1997. In the Code many innovations should ensure a
legislative basis for the struggle against organised crime. Examples include
the definition of the concepts «organised group», «criminal community» (Art.
35); establishment of criminal liability for organising a criminal community,
or for participating in a criminal community (Art. 210); criminalization of
actions committed by criminal organisations – kidnapping of persons, money
laundering and other activities; increasing the criminal liability for certain
crimes – murder, grievous bodily harm, rape, theft, swindling, robbery,
extortion and others – if they are committed by an organised group; etc.
Fourth,
the technical, financial and personnel equipment of special police units (in
particular, the Regional Board of Organised Crimes) is insufficient.
Fifth,
political games and corruption prevent the development of a scientific strategy
and of tactics for effectively combatting organised
crime.
And finally, the main problem: It is unrealistic to
expect real and successful action against organised crime in conditions of
economic, financial, social and political crisis and instability, and in
conditions of widespread corruption in the power structures (federal and region
al), in the police and the courts.
Proposed
measures including new legislation to combat
organised
crime
International
experience of combatting organised crime (in Italy,
the USA, Japan, and in other countries) shows that the repressive measures adopted
by the police and the criminal justice system are not particularly effective.
This is true even in respect to well-financed programs (for example, the
so-called «Pennsylvanian» in the USA). It is particularly difficult to combat
organised crime in modern Russia for the reasons stated above.
I
consider economic, social, and political measures to be the most important. For instance:
– Economic, social, and political
support for and development of legal business enterprises or legal human
activities. It is necessary to remember that people are in need of material,
financial, technical and other means of satisfaction of their natural, social
and spiritual needs. If people do not find legal means, they will resort to
illegal ones, including criminal means. The higher the degree of «responsive»
societies (as put by A. Etzioni), the greater is the
probability of legal behaviour, and the lower is the probability of illegal
behaviour by the people for the satisfaction of their needs. Unfortunately, the
degree of «responsivity» of modern Russian society is
very low. The economic policy of the state should ensure large profits to legal
businesses, in comparison to illegal ones.
– Decrease of unemployment. The unemployed, especially
young unemployed people, are the main recruitment sources for organised crime.
The proportion of nonworking and non-student persons of those in the
able-bodied age range has grown among all criminals apprehended in Russia from
12 % in 1987 up to 45 % in 1995 (Crime and Delinquency 1994; Abramkin 1996).
– Reduction of corruption through
political methods. «Corruption is a global phenomenon» (TI Newsletter: 2), but
it is a particular evil in Russia. Widespread corruption is the main obstacle
to combating organised crime in Russia.
Moreover, legal measures are necessary. For example:
– Improving the legislation for
combating organised crime (the laws «On Combating Organised Crime», «On
Combating Corruption», «On Money Laundering», etc);
– Supporting the activity of the special
police unit with high-level professional staff and equipment;
– Providing for information, through
international police connections.
Criminal organisations are an inevitable element of
contemporary society. They are well adapted to society – may we have to adapt
our selves to them?
Summary
The
following elements are typical of organised crime in Russia:
– Its extent (it controls over 40–60 %
of the country’s business enterprises and banks);
– Its very high profits («superprofit»);
– It performs the functions of law
enforcement bodies: «arbitration», «enforcement of verdicts», «security»;
– Widespread corruption of power in the
administrative and law enforcement bodies at all levels;
– Broad social basis for organised
crime. Many idle hands are available among juveniles, and legal business
activity is very difficult owing to widespread corruption, extremely high taxes
(up to 80–85 %), criminal mentality, and social anomie;
– Widespread use of violent methods;
– Growing politicization of organised crime;
criminalization of policy and the economy.
Russia
is going farther and farther along the road to the state and
society becoming
involved in crime. Democracy and economic reforms
are
jeopardized.
References
Abadinsky,
Howard (1994). Organized Crime. Fourth Edition. Chicago: Nelson Hall.
Abramkin,
V. (1996). In Search of a Solution. Crime, Criminal Policy and Prison
Facilities in the Former Soviet Union. Moscow: Human Rights Publishers.
Arlacchi, Pino (1986). Mafia Business. The Mafia Ethic and the
Spirit of Capital ism. Verso Edition.
Becker, Gary (1987). Economic Analysis and Human Behaviour. Advances
in Behav ioural Sciences.
Norwood (NY): Ablew Publishing Corporation. Vol. 1.:
3–17.
Block, Alan (1994). Space,
Time and Organized Crime. Transaction Publishers.
Change of Criminality in Russia.
Moscow: Association for Criminology, 1994 (in Russian).
Crime and Delinquency. 1994 Statistical Review. Moscow: Ministry of Internal Af fairs of
Russia. 1995 (in Russian).
Kelly, Robert & KoLin Chin & Rufus Schatzbery (eds.)(1994). Handbook of Organized Crime In
the United States. Greenwood Press.
Laquer, Walter (1994). Black
Hundred, the Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia. Problems of Eastern
Europe. Washington.
TI Newsletter. Transparency International, the Coalition against Corruption in
International Business Transactions. March 1996.
Note
*
This term is used by the author on several occasions. Not found in
dictionaries, it is nevertheless quite illustrative of the message, if
understood to refer to «lumpenproletariat»... (K.A.)
[1] Yakov Gilinskiy (1998) Organised Crime: The Russian
and World Perspective. In: Kauko Aromaa
(Ed.) The Baltic Region. Insights in Crime and Crime Control. Pax Forlag A/S, Oslo 1998.
P.168182.