“Pirke Avot” (“Ethics of the Father”) – Revisiting a Mishnaic
tractate from the Perspective of Jewish Legal Philosophy
By
Rabbi Peter Tarlow.
Hillel Foundation
Each summer Jews around the world read a
short Mishnanic "tractate" called Pirke Avot or in English
"Ethics of the Fathers." Pirke Avot is one of the more
unique tractates found in the Mishnah. As Trevers Herdford has noted, Pirke Avot is not considered to be halachah
(religious law). Pirke
Avot likewise is not considered to be a devotional
work. Yet this short and some might say
pithy work "speaks to the heart of the Jew, in a manner and with a force
seldom realized by non-Jewish readers, and attempts to expound its teachings
and significance fail insofar as that fact is not understood" (Herdford: 1). Although legal scholars consider Pirke Avot to be a minor
"tractate" of Jewish "law-ethics", its influence within the
Jewish world is perhaps far greater than that of many other texts. Traditionally, these scholars have not considered the work to be a
"classic" or even literature.
In fact the book or tractate is more an anthology of pithy statements
than anything else and unless examined carefully a reader is capable of assuming
that there is no one theme or set of themes that unites the work. Furthermore the public is more likely to
place greater emphasis on these individual statements than on the work as a
whole. Yet in contrast to large sections
of Talmud which remain unheard of or incomprehensible to many readers both in
the non-Jewish world and even in Jewish world, Pirke Avot is read and reread and its influence is felt not only
in scholarly circle but throughout the Western world. The great number of
commentaries written about this work give testimony to its success among
the masses and provide us with a great many insights into the philosophy of the
"rabbis" or scholars who not only shaped modern Jewish thought but
also shaped much of Western civilization.
The purpose of this paper is to revisit Pirke Avot from the perspective
of Jewish legal philosophy. Such a task
is generally not easy in Jewish texts as the rabbis who shaped modern Judaism
never expounded a formal philosophy or systematic thought process. Such an organizational lack does not mean
that these scholars did not have an overall approach to life and law. It means that we must tease this philosophy
out from between the lines and seek to read the text not merely as black on
white, but also read the white spaces between the text's black letters. The reward for such a search is a better
understanding of the thought processes of men who lived around 2,000 years ago
and from whom much of modern Judaism developed as well as Western
civilization. Historians often call the
period of time in which these scholars lived the "
This essay will first examine where Pirke Avot fits within the
context of Second Commonwealth Hebrew Literature. The essay examines the overall assumptions
regarding human beings and their place in society. The essay then asks how the Second
Commonwealth Rabbis understood the human ability to hurt/harm others. It will then ask if Pirke
Avot demonstrates a coherent philosophy.
To understand Pirke
Avot's place within Jewish "legalistic"
literature, we mist first take a step back and review this body of literature's
historical background. In reality, the
term legal literature may be considered a poor word choice. Classical Hebrew readers would not have
divided literature into fiction and non-fiction but rather they would have
divided literature into "halachic"
literature and "aggadic" literature. As these terms' precise equivalents do not
exist in Western literary criticism, they not easy terms to translate. For simplicity's sake, halachic
literature refers to literature which surrounds that body of Jewish
jurisprudence called "halachah" or the
"right way to go/walk through life."
The word halachah refers to both the
particular ordinance and to the body of halachas. Much of the Talmudic literature and all of
the codes are classified as "halachic." The opposite of halachic
literature is aggadic literature. "Aggadah,"
is a word derived from the verb l'hagid and related
to the telling of stories or tales. For
example, the word aggadah is related to the Hagadah. The Hagadah is the name of the book read yearly at the Passover
Seder meal that recounts the story of the Jewish Exodus from Egyptian
slavery. Aggadah
refers to both a specific tale and to total body of this form of writing. Aggadah often seeks
to fill in the gaps of a Biblical text or to offer an overall worldview. Although Aggadaic
literature never has the force of law, it aids the reader in expounding ideas and concepts from
which a/the halachah may grow.
The foundation of Hebrew literature is
the "Tanach", a Hebrew Acronym that
represents the three classical parts of the Hebrew Holy Scriptures. Classically the text is divided into the
first five books called the Pentateuch (Torah in Hebrew), the prophetic sections
(Niviim) and the various literary sections (Ktuvim). While
Hebrew literature considers all three sections as part of Holy Writ only the
Torah is considered to have been written by G-d and carries the force of
constitutional law. Because it is
assumed that G-D wrote the Torah, it logically follows that the text is perfect
and therefore not open to amends. This
assumption of perfection has presented Jewish lawmakers with countless
challenges down through the ages. As
Horowitz notes " The Torah as written often failed
to give any clear direction or even intimation of what to do in a particular
case" (Horowitz: 12). How does one
handle a non-Torah-foreseen situation?
What does one do when the Torah text is vague or terms, such as work or
murder are left undefined? To meet these
legal challenges, the "sofrim" (scribes or
proto-rabbis) created a unique solution.
By combining tradition and law through interpretation, they created the
notion of the oral law ("Torah sheBaal Peh") and developed what they called a "halachah" or a body of rulings that spoke to the
proper conduct for each new problem.
These halachot (plural of halachah)
slowly transformed into a theory of the "Two-fold Torah" or as it
would become best known the "oral law". The principle held that two "Torahs"
were given at Sinai, one the written law ("Torah shebKativ")
and the other an ongoing oral law. This
two-Torah approach gave new life and meaning to the written law and acted very
much as a supreme court does, that is to say, interpreting a constitutional
text and deriving new laws based on constitutional (in this case the Torah)
principles.
In the second century of the Common Era
many of these halachot were compiled into a new book,
called Mishnah (derived from the verbal root sh-n-h meaning to teach, repeat or change). It is commonly accepted that Yehuda ha'Nasi, grandson of Gamliel II is the person who melded the various rules and
legal interpretations from the post
Despite the massive effort by Yehuda ha'Nasi , he did not collect all of the various oral laws (halachot) nor did the Mishnah
answer all questions of Jewish law.
Instead the Mishnah raised a whole host of new
issues. To add to the difficulty, the Mishnah assumed that the reader was already familiar with
Jewish law. As
Horowitz notes: "It (the Mishnah) is a collection of concise notes, memoranda for
scholars already familiar with its subject matter. Technical terms are
used regularlyÉThe Mishnah
was intended as a reminder for men 'in the know'". (Horowitz: 34). This difficulty resulted in new works of
interpretation such as the Gemara along with a great
deal of other works of Halachah. The difficulties in reading so much of the Mishnah coupled with Pirke Avot's high degree of readability may help to explain why
this text would have a greater influence than one might suppose or why it was
so popular with the non-scholarly population.
Being a bridge between the legalistic and the aggadic,
the materialistic and the spiritual, Pirke Avot not only spoke to people living some two thousand
years ago, but also to people living at the dawn of the twenty-first century.
Pirke Avot is however very much a mishnaic
text. The work assumes that everyone
accepts the idea of a two fold Torah and the oral law, or chain of tradition.. Pirke Avot's opening verse reads:
"Moses received Torah from Sinai and delivered it to Joshua and Joshua to
the Elders; and the Elders to the Prophets, and the Prophets delivered it to
the Men of the Great Synagogue (Anshei Knesset Gdolah)" (Pirke Avot 1:1).
Sociologists might classify Pirke Avot as a
social-theological text. The text
assumes that G'd is the ultimate ruler of the
universe, but realizes that G'd needs human
society. The text begins then by
defining the minimal standards for that society to exist. For a society to survive text informs its
readers the world must have: Torah (or body of law), avodah
(a Hebrew word that means both physical work and worship), and gemilut chasidim (approximately
translated as: kindly acts performed by human beings for other human
beings). These three basic concepts set
the tone for the work. Societies that
lack a sense of law/moral guidance system (Torah), a work and worship ethic,
and a sense of mutual helping simply will cease to exist. From this definition we may define
anti-societal acts as those which destroy Torah (legal guidance systems),
work/worship (a society's social structure) and interpersonal
relationships. This assumption, that law
changes as it travels through history but that no matter what the
interpretation it must exist in a world of social structure and interpersonal
relationships, sets
the tone for the work's essence.
Although Pirke Avot does not rank these three social traits in terms of
importance, traditionally Torah has acted as the guiding principle that
determines the rest. Thus, the Siddur (prayer book) reminds its readers that: "these
are the obligations without measure, whose reward too is without measure: to
honor mother and father; to perform acts of love and kindness; to attend the
house of study daily; to welcome the stranger; to visit the sick; to rejoice
with the bride and groom; to console the bereaved; to pray with sincerity; to
make peace where there is strife. V'talmud Torah kneged culam ..and the study of Torah is equal to them all, because it
leads to them all." (Gates of Prayer: 285)
Pirke Avot never explains what it means by the world being
dependent (standing on) these three principles.
Is it humanity's choice to accept these three principles, and thus they
are a manifestation of humanity's free will?
Are they simply the basis for existence? If so, do Torah, Avodah and Gemilut exist
independently from us? Can we then
define evil as our having chosen to ignore the world's foundational
principles? What does it mean to choose,
assuming that choice is a possibility, to live in a world without Torah, Avodah and Gemilut
Chassidim? If we reject such a
foundation are we to suffer (pay the consequences for our rejection) and if
such is the case is there a relationship between this suffering and criminal
actions?
These questions lead us to ask what is criminal responsibility.
Rabbinic Midrashic sources have long dealt
with this issue. For example, Bialik quotes in his Sefer Ha'Aggadah (Book of Legends) the famous midrash (parable) of Cain's
challenge to G'd when Cain says. "Am I expected
to be my brother's keeper"? (Gen. 4:9) You are the keeper of all
creatures, yet You call me to account for him. Cain's
question may be understood by the parable of a thief who stole some vessels
during the night and was not caught. The following morning the gatekeeper caught him and asked" Why
did you steal the vessels?" The thief replied, "I, thief that
I am, did not slacken at my trade, but you- your trade is to keep watch at the
gate, why did you slacken at your occupation? (Sefer Ha'Aggadah: paragraph 101). Cain then goes on to argue with G'd stating in the end "The whole world, all of it,
you bear; yet my sin you cannot bear! Is my sin so great that it cannot be
borne?" (Ibid) Interestingly
enough, Bialik does not offer a response from
G-d. In fact, G-d repents to some extent
and lessens Cain's punishment stating, "Since you vowed repentance, go
forth as a wander from this place" (Ibid).
In other words, Cain's act of murder becomes manslaughter. It is assumed that he could not help himself
and that his ignorance (how could he have known better?) is at least a
mitigating circumstance permitting a lesser punishment. Cain also argues that the action is in itself
the suffering, that his punishment is an unnecessary and superfluous act. This same argument is made in our own time by
the theo-criminologist Thomas Pangle. Pangle poses the
same question as Cain. He notes
"However we are to understand criminal responsibility; what are the
intelligible grounds for the overwhelming that the guilty deserve to suffer for what they have done; and what
are the intelligible ground for the concomitant hope that they-and even we ourselves-will suffer the punishment
that they, and we, deserve? É.Why then, is it
appropriate, why is it sensible, that such a cripple or alienated being
receive, in addition to and as a consequence of its corruption or alienation,
further harm or suffering? (Pangle: 101). The midrash
in Sefer Ha'Aggadah
would seem to agree with Pangle at least to a
degree. Cain is given a hearing by G-d
and while he is punished the punishment severity is lessened.
Pirke Avot stands then at the opposite side from the Genesis
tales. It does, however, parallel Exodus
23:2 "Lo tihyehy acharei
rabbim l'ra'ah/do not
follow the multitudes for the sake of evil É." Both this verse and Pirke Avot answer Pangle's musing regarding retributions for crime, the
answer being yes. He who brings
suffering on others will also suffer.
From the perspective of Pirke Avot evil is contagious.
That is to say, that it assumes that the humans act not only due their
own choosing but are influenced by the actions of others. (Pirke Avot: 1, 7)
Is crime evil a contagious social
disease? The question if evil (crime) is
a social disease that is can infect others is central to the theory of
law. If others neither can be infected
by our criminal actions nor can negatively learn from them, then the need for
social isolation and punishment may not be necessary. Pirke Avot touches on this issue beginning in chapter one. Thus, we read that: "Nitai
the Arbaite stated: Keep away form an evil neighbor;
do not associate with the lawless, and do not suppose that no price is paid for
wickedness." Not only is there is a
need for retributive justice, but wickedness may underlie the entire social
fabric. Evil neighbors may influence
good people into copying evil actions.
Were there to be any question as to if this text follows the classical
norms of Judaism, one would merely need to go to the Torah itself.
This assumption of humans being open to
outside influence goes back to the earliest parts of Genesis. For example, both the tale of the Garden of
Eden and that of Noah reflect the assumption that humans are capable of
influencing their peers. For argument's
sake, let us set aside the question of the snake being a divine instrument
whose purpose was to seduce morally Eve and Adam. The text sees the snake an independent agent
capable of moral seduction. It is the
snake that influences/convinces Eve to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of
Good. In turn, it appears from the text
that Eve not only samples the fruit but also take responsibility for convincing
Adam to taste the forbidden fruit.
Readers can view the
The Noah tale is another good example of
the rabbi's belief that humans are highly open to negative influence. Noah is not saved because he is a wonderful
and outstanding human being. The first
line of the Hebrew text makes this abundantly clear. Genesis states:
"Eleh toldot Noach, Noach
ish tzadik tamim haya b'doratvÉThese
are the generations of Noah, Noah was a righteous man and simple (na•ve) man in/for his
generation(s)." The inseparable
preposition "b'" before the word dorotav
has long fascinated Biblical commentators and rabbis. This preposition is usually translated as
"in" or "at". It
tends to indicate a sense of exclusivity.
Was it that Noah was the righteous one of his generation? Or does the text indicate that in comparison
to everyone else Noah was righteous? Is it
better/harder to be good when surrounded by evil or do we judge goodness as an
absolute rather than as a comparison?
Finally, what does the word "tamim" mean. Is it that he
was pure or simply na•ve or
did Noah not chose to know what was going on under his own eyes? Can we be influenced by what we chose not to
note or only by what we aware of?
Perhaps Ben Azai sums this position up best
when he states" Be quick to obey a minor Mitzvah as a major one, and flee
from transgression: for one mitzvah performed leads to another, and one
transgression leads to anotherÉ.(Pirke Avot: 4:2). It is perhaps unfortunate that when the
Property
law/rights
The classical case of property law comes
from what may be the Talmud's most widely studied tractate (masechtah)
Bava Matzia. Its opening phrase "shnayim
ochazin batlait (let us suppose that
two people lay claim to the same garment) deals with the case of two people who
lay claim to the same garment. The
question is of course, how do we settle a Salomonic dispute.
While, unlike Bava Matzia,
Pirke Avot is not halachah nor does it have the force of law, its quotations
do provide us with an easy insight into the philosophy of
The Torah itself was very sensitive to
multiple forms of property rights. Thus, Exodus 22 (6-8) to the bailor. These verses are expanded in Tractate Bava Matzia and placed into 4 major
classifications. The four bailees (shomrim) are:
1. The person
who borrows (shoel) for the benefit of the bailee and does not seek a reward;
2. The
gratuitous bailee (shomer chinam) who holds property for the bailor's
benefit
3. The hired bailee (nosey sachar) where the
possession is for the bailor's benefit and he pays
the bailee to hold the possession
4. The Hirer (socher) who hold the possession for his benefit
. (Horowitz: 519)
This legal philosophical attitude is the
grounding out of which major Jewish tractates of law grew. From the perspective of the West, this highly
sophisticated legal system entered either directly or indirectly into Western
legal thought. Pirke
Avot sets the stage for property rights by quoting
Rabbi Yossi. "Let your neighbor's property be as
dear to you as your own; train yourself to study Torah, for the knowledge of it
is not inherited; and let all your deeds be for the sake of G'd"
(2:17). Rabbi Yossi brings up three important issues
regarding property rights. Reading this
quote one is reminded immediately of a person staying in a hotel. The guest
does not own the hotel room, but merely uses it (for a cost) for a short period
of time. Rabbi Yossi's
point then forms a basis of Jewish property law that we are to care for
another's property. Simply because we
may not own the property does not give us the right to abuse it. Secondly Rabbi
Yossi connects property law with Torah law. The caring of another's property is not
simply a question of personal choice, but rather it is a question of law. Law for Rabbi Yossi
comes about only through knowledge.
Property rights then are not pre-programmed into the human being rather
these rights must be learned. This
assumption that property rights are acquired knowledge leads to the question of
whose responsibility is it to teach the law, the users or the owners? Finally, Yossi
grounds his dictum in Divine authority. The taking care of another's property
is not simply a nice thing to do, but a basis for social behavior. In order to avoid a Hobbesian
state of never ending conflict, it is essential that we respect another's
property.
Pirke Avot did not see itself as a theoretical work. It quotes
Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa as saying "when deeds exceed (learned) wisdom,
the (acquired) wisdom endures, but when acquired wisdom/learning exceeds deeds,
then it does not endure" (
The connection between Torah and Kemach is exemplified in the Torah's views on the paying of
wages. Leviticus declares that "the wages of a hired servant shall not
remain with you all night until the morning (Leviticus
Is
there a unifying theory in Pirke Avot.
Because Pirke Avot is a composite work
one might not expect any unifying theory of law to be found in the work. Such a supposition, however, would be
incorrect. The text revolves around a
number of central principles. These
include the following.
1. The dignity of
the individual. Pirke
Avot does not judge people by class but rather by
actions. Ben Azai
emphasizes this idea when he writes "Despise no one, and call nothing
useless, for there is no one whose hour does not come and there is no thing
that does not have its place." (4.3). Rabbi Eliezer
emphasizes this point by stating "let your neighbor's honor be as dear to
you as your ownÉ" (
2. The right to
disagree and to bring matters before an impartial court. Thus
3. Society is
ruled by law and without law, societies collapse. "There are three crowns (crown = forms
of power), the crown of Torah (law), the crown of priesthood (khuna =cult) and the crown of royalty (secular state), but
the crown of a good name excels them all" (
4. Words are
meaningless if not translated into actions.
"When our learning exceeds our deeds we are like trees whose branches are
many but whose roots are fewÉ." (
While it is impossible to state that Pirke Avot develops a
comprehensive theory of Jewish law, it has sunk into the conscious and
subconscious of the Jewish people. The
fact that it has been read on a regular basis and studied not merely by the
scholars but also by the masses means that its influence if far greater than its six (and some argue five) slim chapters. This may be truer today then at other points
in Jewish history, where Pirke Avot
is more widely read by many lay people than many Talmudic texts. As such not only is its judicial influence
felt but it sets standards for Jewish political morality and its influence may
extend at least in an indirect manner to twenty-first century world
affairs.
Notes: Translations of the Hebrew either
from the Gates of Prayer or by author
Horowitz, George, The
Spirit of Jewish Law, Central Book Company,
Pangle, Thomas,
Political Philosophy and
the God of Abraham, The