Editor’s
Address
THE
ONLINE QUARTERLY REVUE OF CRIME, ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.
AN
ADVOCACY FOR INVESTIGATION AND FUNDAMENTAL THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF THE
COMPLEX RELATIONS BETWEEN CRIME, ETHICS AND SOCIAL & POLITICAL PHILPOSOPHY.
‘ Virtue being,
as we have seen, of two kinds, intellectual and moral; intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and
increased by instruction , and therefore requires experience and time; whereas
moral or ethical virtue is
the product of habit (ethos), and has indeed derived its nature, with a
slight variation of form, from that word. And therefore it is clear that none
of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, for no natural property can
be altered by habit…..The virtues therefore are engendered in us neither by
nature nor yet in opposition of nature;
nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to humanity by habit;’
(Aristotle Nicomachean Ethic Book
II 1-3)
‘ Now we
consider that everybody means by Justice
that moral disposition which
renders men apt to do just things, and
which causes them to act justly and to wish what is just, by Injustice that
disposition which makes men act injustly and wish
what is injust’
(Nicomachean Ethic Book V, 3)
Why launch a new journal? The first possible
response would acknowledge that this journal is the official organ of the
recently founded European Research Group Crime Ethics and Social Philosophy
(ERCES). But this cannot satisfy our curiosity. Why launch this journal? – Look
on the journal’s mission statement and you will understand! Here again, those
who are curious about the reasons for launching this journal can be reasonably
expected to feel disappointed with the acknowledgment of the journal’s
dedication to investigation & fundamental theoretical discussion of crime
and deviance, providing a focal-centre for ethics, social philosophy and social
theory discussion. After all one might ask; ‘What has crime to do with ethics,
social philosophy and social theory discussion?’ From the moment on when this
question is raised, there is need to clarify this relation. The journal is
targeted to this objective, and this target is the reason for which it is
launched.
If there is need for investigation, it is because
this relation is not o,ly complex, but also because
the investigation of this issue has, for reasons which will be discussed later
in this essay, received, to a certain degree, less consideration than other
issues in social sciences – hardly, if not at all perceptible in criminology;
and yet the commitment to investigate this issue, in many, regards, constitutes
one of the most crucial challenges social sciences in general, and criminology
in particular have to face in order to discuss and resolve the problems of our
times.
I.
The Actuality of the Issue
The relation between crime, ethics and social
philosophy, is, as I have said before, an issue which has received, to a
certain degree, less consideration than others in social sciences and social
theory. Indeed, the validity of this observation is depending on our definition
and understanding of ‘ethics’. In its most common sense, the word ‘Ethics’
means a broad range of issues concerned with values – good / bad, just / unjust
etc – and with those rules which determine our disposition to do right or
wrong, behalf in a good/ bad way, act justly / unjustly. In everyday life, the
word ‘ethics’ is most often associated with ‘morals’, and all the evidence
suggests that the two notions are rarely distinguished; in everyday life much,
if not all of us, apply either the one or the other word to express the same
concerns.
As far as this most common sense of the word is
concerned, everybody understand by ethics (i) the
disposition of men and women to do right or wrong, good and bad etc ( for
Aristotle this disposition is synonymous with justice) (ii) the rules and
costumes which determine that disposition. We find both aspects in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethic where ethics is used
as a synonym of morals and where ethic is defined as a virtue engendered in us
by habit.
1.- Values,
Norms and Facts: Strange bedfellows
‘Doing this or that is a morally deplorable act’ –
the person who enounces this proposal appreciates or evaluates human behavior.
It is therefore clear that ethical concerns refer to values. For most, if not
all of us, crime is a morally deplorable act; it is a morally deplorable act,
because it hurts common values and our consciousness.
Social sciences are often dealing with ethical
problems, and in modern sociology and social theory the great classics of Max
Weber, Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx provide a focal-centre on values,
and in these works, social problems are thought and analyzed in association
with values. And yet, ethics and social sciences, ethics and criminology and
ethics and crime seem to be strange bedfellows. Indeed, social sciences, and in
particular criminology are traditionally empirical sciences, in other words
they are sciences of observation; their proposals and statements are, from the
viewpoint of their logical-semantic structure, genuinely descriptive, whereas
ethics, as far as the science which provides for normative statements about
morally approved or disapproved human behavior, would rather refer to values
and to a system of appreciative and / or prescriptive proposals. For a long
period analytical and positivist philosophy has been dominated by the dogma of
the impossibility to decide on the validity of appreciative and /or
prescriptive proposals. The dominant opinion was that it is impossible to
provide for rational assessments about the question whether appreciative and/or
prescriptive proposals are true or not true. Closely connected with this
opinion is the precept, developed first by Hume and Kant and later by Poincaré, that claims the absolute necessity to separate
'what is' from 'what ought to be’, and highlighters the impossibility to deduce
norms and values from facts. And yet in contemporary analytical philosophy,
this dogma is no longer thought as from an absolute figure. According to van
Wright, Nagel, Putman and Larmore, such proposals can
be true or not true. For these authors proposals as ‘Slavery is bad’,
‘Democracy is good’ or ‘Death-penalty is unjust’ are rationally legitimate, if
not true proposals. Other who provide for a more anthropological approach to
this problem, assess against Hume that the traditional distinction between
facts and norms, between axiological and empirical – positivist certainties
hurts empirical evidence. (Boudon 1982:417-28))
Raymond Boudon, for example, put in his ‘Le Juste et le Vrai’ (1995) that
empirical and axiological certainties have the same origin if not the same
nature. Even Kant, who advocated the impossibility to derive that what ought to
be from that what is did not disapprove the inverse case; according to his
opinion, that what is can derive from that what ought to be, because norms
might engender facts. Hans Kelsen, the inventor of
contemporary legal positivism and one of the most categorical opponents of the
confusion between facts and norms, legal norms and morals, did so too.
Nonetheless the problem of the validity, as it is
raised in positivist philosophy, is not entirely resolved, and empirical social
sciences are strongly influenced by Hume’s precept. The problem of the validity
is raised otherwise, in particular in anthropology, ethnography, psychology and
philosophical and/or historical materialism. In these scientific areas, the
problem is no longer defined with reference to the logical– semantic structure
of descriptive and normative propositions, not as of the possibility’
impossibility to make rationally legitimate or true proposals about assessments
as, for example, ‘slavery is bad’, but as of an artificial or ideological
construction. Thus for Freud, Nietzsche and Marx, morals, and in particular
morals as inherent part in religion, are devoid of any objective and real
reference; for these authors, they are valid, but as ideological figures. In
this context facts being associated with norms, empirical certainties to
axiological certainties do not serve, as it is for example the case in Raymond
Boudon’s works, as support for the empirical, objective and, consequently
rational or irrational nature of ‘axiological realities’, but as support for a
critique that, by dissolving moral rules into the world of facts, deny their
authenticity and objectivity. As for Claude Levi–Strauss, who applied
structuralism to ethnography, the rule which provides for the interdiction of
incest is determined by the elementary structure of blood-relationship that
provides matrimonial relations with normative limits; thus the prohibition of
incest is not thought as of a moral state of consciousness, but as from social
structure and function (basic condition for exchange and society of exchange),
all the more so as for Lévi-Strauss the social structure and real objective
significance of social life and organization is not hosted within
consciousness.
Second, as far as crime is defined with reference to
the tradition of legal positivism and as far as it is thought as a matter of
criminological research ( criminology as empirical science), crime refers to
norms, whereas ethics refer to values. Here again we must acknowledge that in
both analytical philosophy and legal positivism norms and values are together
with their respective referential orders thought as from antagonistic relation
( Wiggins 1991: 95). It is therefore clear that criminology, as far as we
understand this discipline as empirical science, provides for objective statements
about an issue which shows genuinely a normative, not an axiological nature. On
this account neither the norms of the
positive law nor the normative disciplines of social sciences - law in general,
criminal law an criminal justice in particular - have concern for ethics.
2.- The
Legal And the Moral Crime talk: Towards Crime Ethics
Law teachers
have no concern for questions about the moral dimension of the law; they do not
ask whether this or that legal disposition is morally deplorable or not; they
have concern for the conditions under which a legal norm can be thought and be
defined as valid; they study the structure of the legal system and when they
question the validity of a legal disposition or a judgment, then never with
reference to morals, but always with reference to the legal system and the
hierarchical order of its norms. When
law teachers and lawyers talk about justice and injustice, then it is always
with regards to the question whether a judgment do or do not comply with
precept ‘nullum crimen
sine lege’, ‘nulla poena sine lege’ both the
rules of the civil or criminal procedure and the; analogically a legal
disposition is just if it conforms with the Constitution, it is unjust if it do
not comply with the Constitution. To resume they talk about justice then it is
generally in the same way as the positivist law does. The teacher and the
positive law define crime as from norms, not as from values.
And yet the same teacher or lawyer, when talking in
everyday-life about justice or injustice, does not necessarily refer to this
positivist-legal understanding. We have all experienced many situations and
many cases where we are well disposed to qualify an act which is legally just
as unjust and inversely. And one of the most celebrate crime-talks that have
ever been made in 19th century social philosophy – Karl Marx’s talk
about the wood-stealers, published in 1842 in the ‘Rheinischen
Zeitung’ must be thought as from a real model or even
a paradigm for moral crime talk. It constitutes somehow the cardinal
philosophical reference for everyday-life crime talk and, given its prominence
in and influence on contemporary social theory, but also criminology, the
authentic contemporary moral crime talk. By distinguishing formal from material
justice / injustice, this ‘crime-talk’ focuses on the conflict between a moral
and a positivist legal conception of Law, and of crime. This distinction exists
in everyday-life and it is familiar to all of us. When the same law-teacher
talks about crime as a private person, then he/she talks about crime as we all
do in daily life and as some philosophers, exactly as the young Marx, have done
and continue to do. All the evidence suggests that the normative and positivist
definition of crime is less prominent in everyday-life crime talk than the
axiological, moral one.
Talking about crime in everyday-life is, it seems,
talking with reference to a certain idea of natural law, rather than with reference
to positivist law. This reminiscence to an upper law of the positivist law - to
natural law, is one of the reasons for the prominence of Marx’s crime talk.
‘Misery makes crime’ – so far the quintessence of Marx’s story. This slogan is
the origin of the economical causes of crime in modern social theory. The
paradigm has had a strong influence on criminology and, even in our times, it
is very prominent in criminology, but also in actual approaches to anomie –
theory, in particular institutional anomie-theory (Bernburg
2002: 729-42). The other important point that we have to acknowledged is the
following one: With this slogan, that is familiar to all of us, but also to
many criminologists, the legal definition of crime has become a morally
deplorable and, given the objective economical circumstances, unjust, if not
oppressive. From ‘Misery makes crime’ to ‘misery is criminal’ the shift is
quickly done. The think-play is serious and there is an ethical case for it –
at least when it culminates in a real ‘ethic of crime’! It is this aspect and
the economic conditions for deviant behavior and for its criminalization which
make the crime-talk of the young Marx so attractive for both everyday-life
crime talk and social scientific and criminological crime talk.
The transfer of this scheme from the discourse of
social theory to that of criminology has several important consequences: Crime
can no longer be thought and defined with reference to a specific, criminal
nature; from now on it is a social construct, the result of its legal
qualification. And, secondly, the scientific analysis of crime, instead of
being focused on a set of typical and quasi natural and genuinely morally
deplorable behavioral and personality characteristics, provides a focal centre
on both crime-making of the formal legal social reaction and functional
definition of crime; the particular nature of this functional definition
consists in this that a neutral connotation is supplanted to the former
‘natural’ negative one. As far as crime is the result of the legal definition
or – in other words: as far as the legal definition of crime is concerned,
crime can no longer be thought nor be analyzed as a figure that impacts common
consciousness. Emphatically, but truly, we might say that that what really
affects common consciousness and supra-individual values is in accordance with
this scheme the ‘revolting’, ‘immoral’ and unjust criminalization of the ‘real’
non alienated consciousness and (common)values of humanity. Labeling theory and
critical radical criminology snatched up this scheme, with slightly variation
from and contents; and it continues to play in contemporary sociological
deviance-theory a role that – however controversial - cannot be neglected.
In Historical Materialism the primacy of the
scientific narrative of Marxism is supplanted to that of a more romantic,
humanist and therefore likely more attractive for human rights. Crime as
expression of class antagonism’ – in this figure the scheme is reduced to its
most radical degree. In the communist
‘society without social class differences’ it culminated in the totalitarian
utopia of a society without crime and without criminology – another case for
ethics.
Closely related to this scheme is Critical Theory’s
and Marxism’s reminiscence to Theory of tyranticide (Jaszi & Lewis 1958). This reminiscence is the result of a reappraisal of the works of the
young Marx[1] that – however
controversial it might be, in particular with regards to dogmatic Marxism and
historical materialism - was and still is very prominent in critical occidental
discourse. By applying it to modern democracy – however problematic such an
intellectual operation may be with regards to modern democracy and the law of
majority[2] - neo-Marxism has provided many contemporary
social philosophers and social theorists with the advocacy of the ‘just crime’
or ‘crime for the just cause’. By the way, note that this ‘think-figure’ has
served for a long time ( and, to a certain degree continues to serve even
today) as ‘philosophical-moral’ support for political violence and terrorism,
in particular terrorism associated with fundamental human rights such as
resistance against oppression, liberty, freedom and equality. Because of its
reminiscence to natural law and a transcendental order, this ‘crime-ethic’ –
however controversial it may be from an ethical viewpoint, but also with
regards to modern political culture and democracy – has marked many areas of
our cultural life; and even if it has lost some of its former prominence, today
it remains – as the polemics and comments on September 11 has shown, attractive
for a large part of the public opinion and a great number of intellectuals.
And yet, given the nature of this key-event, such
attraction is together with the corresponding schemes of interpretation devoid
of any legitimacy; it cannot be justified neither with reference to
reason, nor ethically ( Adler 2002; Glucksmann 2001. See in this issue the article of Simon Cottee)[3]. If this crime ethic can be
justified neither ethically nor with reference to the rationale of modern
democracy, what is it then that can explain its attraction and prominence? It
is that ‘moral complex’ which is inherent in legal positivism and which has
favored the contemporary attempts to get back in touch with the tradition of
natural law. By referring to
.By this I understand in accordance with the French historian François Furet (1985) the circumstance that the democratic legality (being based on the rule of majority) refers always to itself and excludes from its rationale the idea of a supra-legality that would refer to a transcendental order. This complex must not always, as it is so often the case and as our example shows, have negative, if not unacceptable consequences. It can also be positive and ethically desirable and necessary, in particular when it figures as a corrector of the positivist law and when it is a principal motor for the reform of the legal system.
3- Moral
Consciousness And Moral Complex In Positivist Law – An Ethical Case.
The positivist law, as I have said before, has no concern
for ethics. - Really? It would be more appropriated to acknowledge that the
validity of the positive law has no concern for ethics. If our comments on Marx
moral crime talk can teach us something, then that the ethical lecture of law
and justice – the supplant of the
ethical or moral validity of law ( of values as a reference for the validity of
law) to that of normative ( of the norms of the positivist law as reference for
validity) is ethically problematic. The same observation applies to ‘crime - ethics’.
What is better, legal positivism Kelsen’s façon or a legal system that receives the validity of its
rules not from its own formal legal structure and procedure, but from a moral
outworker? Given the experience of the NAZI and Communist totalitarian States -
in both cases, the constitutional principles – either formal or material- of
the democratic liberal state was dissolved into a ‘ legality’ dominated by the
totalitarian Communist and NAZI – ethics -, the question should be raised.
The fact is that there is a normative (ethical) case
for positivism in national or domestic and international law. By this I mean
that ethical considerations might and, as far as Hans Kelsen
or Benedict Kingsbury are concerned, effectively have served as ‘rational
choice-makers’ providing the primacy of legal positivism upon natural rights
with rationally based and convincing legitimization[4].
Human rights, international right, crime against
humanity, war-crime are matters that have a very strong ethical coloration.
They are altogether incorporated within the broad range of positivist law; but
they are transcending altogether a sort of super-legality - a refugee of
natural law. In Human rights,
International right, crime against humanity, war-crime the law shows its
concern for ethics; historically these figures are indeed the result of the
attempt to get back in touch with and to re-invent the concept and the
tradition of natural right, but also its traditional role of a critical
instance for politics by means of an interpretation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the constitution of the UNO. Because of its
universal validity and acceptance, either postulated or real, this particular
figure of legality is appropriately represented in the image of a higher
instance for legal correctness – the ethical or moral consciousness of
positivist law, but also of domestic and international politics. Indeed, human
rights are often thought in association with the ‘right of the rights’ (Delmas-Marty 2003:13-25) or even the upper right’s right,
international right as the legal means to build on a world-wide universal
ethical – security and peace-keeping - policy for politics destined to supplant
the sovereignty of the world community to that of the nation (Delmas-Marty 2003:13-25;
2002:1915-29; Cassese2002; 2000.Badie 1993) Human rights and positivist
law are often quarrelsome bedfellows; emphatically and schematically the apple
of discord is as follows: the former is the idealist who claims for humanism
and universal material justice, whereas the latter, more formalist, trust a
rather normative conception where the problem of justice and injustice is a
question of the formal validity of norms. It is impossible to draw - even in a
non exhaustive manner - the list of examples for this quarrelsome couple. A
look on the 2004 March issue of the very prestigious Newsletter of the
Cambridge Institute of Criminology, which, on page 8-9, provides its lectures
with a global overview on the projects of the Centre for Penal Theory and Penal
Ethics addresses it at length ( von Hirsch 2004: 8-9). As for crime against
humanity, it is an exceptional offence that has been created to apply to
exceptional situations: its original aim was to provide the victims of the
holocaust with justice – not that one that applies to normal situation and is
contained within the rules of the positive law, but that which is required by
the tragedy of humanity and which therefore requires in turn for a criminal
procedure’s state of emergency providing for retro-activity and not time-barred
charges (Badinter 1998:i-VIII).
Apart from crime against humanity – an issue that
cannot be thought as from an ethically controversial figure, in human rights
and UN’s security and peace keeping mission, there is good case for ethical
debate and controversy, just because the ethical connotation is stronger in
this area than it is elsewhere in law. As for the principle, one might ask
indeed whether the attempt to re-invent the concept and the tradition of
natural right by means of an interpretation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights – however legitimate such interpretation might be from an ethical
viewpoint, is not worthy of inquiry from an ethical viewpoint.
The universality of human rights can be thought and -
given multi-cultural and communitarian critics - was and, to a certain degree,
is effectively considered an illusion: How is it possible to provide for an
ethical legitimization for a universality which is an illusion. The same
observation can be made for its application. Is it possible? And even if it is,
as some specialists suggest (Delmas-Marty 2003:13-25), possible to provide for such a
legitimization, the particular philosophical and cultural background of Human
Rights would it not be then a good case for cultural imperialism? We must
furthermore acknowledge that human rights are often the stage of controversial
interpretation and ethical conflict. All the evidence suggests that human
rights and communitarian and multicultural society must not necessarily exclude
each other. And a multi-cultural and communitarian conception of human rights
obviously exists.
We all know that in some cultures of our world,
namely African culture, the excision of the clitoris is frequently practiced.
And we have also acknowledged this during the last years increasing all out
effort against this cultural habit within NGO, namely human rights’ movement
and associations. These NGO claim in the name of human rights, in particular
equality of sex and equality of rights for legal prohibition and sanction of
these practices. The opponents, providing a focal-centre on the right for
cultural difference, refuse the idea that such cultural habit is discriminatory
and constitutes an offence against human rights. Let me stress the importance
of this ethical case as follows: Is it morally possible to claim In the name of
the right for cultural difference the right for women to be devoid of right?
Have women the right for an offence against their physical integrity – is it
morally justified to deny them the right to be woman and the right to feel
pleasure. And; who requires for this right – the women, the men, the abstract
subject of a culture? And: are we still moving in ‘multiculturality’ or is it
rather ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘cultural essentialism’ that engender such
requirement. According to Floya Anthias
1995: 298) and Jock Young (2002: 593-611; see also Bauman: 1995: 188) who have
stressed the importance of this difference[5], multiculturalism and
cultural essentialism can be hardly associated to human rights, and given the
nature and the consequences of such right for cultural difference, there is a
case of advocating the ‘multiculturalist’ rather than the ‘multicultural’
nature of this issue.
As far as human right engender ethical conflict, an
analogy is easily drawn between that case and the ‘affaire of the headscarf’
which is at the focal-centre of today’s public debate in France, but also in
other European nations has shown concern for it, The historical development of
this case amply discusses the complexity of this case: Without the
acknowledgment of increasing development of Islamic fundamentalism and the
growing prominence of headscarf within the Muslim population; without the
acknowledgment that Islam’s importance as France’s second religion – without
the progressive disintegration of significant proportions of second or third
generation of north-African immigrants youths; without the radicalization of
inter-ethical conflict associated to an extraordinary renewal of anti-Semitism
and anti-Semitist violence and crime, most often and in the great majority of
the cases committed by young men from this disintegrated population – without
the acknowledgment that the French model of integration has felt into a very
deep crisis, this case would have hardly developed into a real Affaire of the
State. The observation that this case is good illustration of how, in every-day
discussions, different ethical talks – equality of rights between men and
women, laity, security and ethically inadmissible renewal of anti-Semitism
associated with crime - interact, are linked together and confused. As far as
the social construction of this case is concerned, the problem of laity came
rapidly to the fore of the public debate. At the heart of the ethical conflict
is the question how to understand laity? At the first glance the answer is for
all of us clear: Laity means the banishment of religion from the political
affairs and life of the State; it supposes the liberty to express our religious
opinion and conviction liberty. It is therefore clear that the central problem
refers to the way of how this liberty expresses concretely and should be
practiced. The answer depends on custom and habit – according to Aristotle: on
morals.
In the
As far as the French case of the headscarf affaire is
concerned, it is therefore clear that the ethical conflict must be thought as
of the conflict between these two models. The circumstance that the
4.-
Crime-Talk: From Constructivism To Criminological Deontology: An Innovative
Epistemological Program
Obviously there is an ethical case for International
law. Is there something in recent history that might be a better and clearer
piece of evidence than the polemics and controversial debates that preceded,
were with and followed the
Public debate and discussion either preceded or
accompanied most, if not all great debates in and reforms of the justice
system; abolishment of the death penalty, creation of crime against humanity,
abortion, cloning of human cells and bio-genetic research on human embryo,
euthanasia, marriage between homosexuals, prostitution etc – all these themes
and the problems raised by them are indeed matters of ethics. More recently,
growing concern about globalization, about crime and the war against it have
favored, in a considerable manner, the renewal of ethical discussion and
controversy in all areas of the social and political life. Moreover the
increasing role played by human rights and international law in social,
political and economical life of our time has, to a very high degree,
contributed to the renewal of ethics.
And all these ethical issues are regularly commented
and discussed in social sciences - frequently in association with crime,
criminal justice, justice and human rights.
How shall we then explain that, as observed earlier
in this essay, social sciences would have paid less attention to the relation
between ethics and crime than to other issues? The answer is not in an
absolute, but a relative response. The proposal is, as mentioned already, valid
only to a certain degree. If the preceding observations can teach something, it
is that crime and criminal justice and criminal law are issues which escape
from the traditional bounds of their original discourse context. Indeed all the
evidence suggests that crime is no longer neither the privileged matter of
criminological discourse, nor the focal-centre of the of the criminal-legal
discourse.
There is an increasing concern for these issues in
social philosophy, human rights and international law and, in turn that
criminology and criminal law are increasingly concerned for ethics, social
philosophy, human right issues; that there is an ethical case for matters of
law and a legal case for ethics. Furthermore, there is obviously a political
case for criminology and a criminological case for politics, either in a
negative or positive sense. This is not a new acknowledgement. What is new is
that the institutional settings, rationales and discourses of both areas
increasingly interact and criminologists show increasing concern for political
talk, whereas politicians, governments and political scientists produce
discourses which focus more and more on crime and criminological –talk. Indeed,
there is a criminological case for corruption, and this case is often
associated with morals. And when Gary LaFree,
recently elected President of the American Society of Criminology, acknowledges
in ‘The Criminologist’ ( Vol 28 No 1 2003, pp 1-5)
that criminology requires democratic societies, that, to be prosperous, it
require the openness of democratic societies, then democracy has become the
reference for a criminological deontology.
in sum the bounds, certainties and sets of
identification which have formally provided for disciplinary and institutional
identity within sciences and which have determined the self-image of clearly
identified and distinguished scientific disciplines and of scientific work, but
also the construction of social reality
have obviously become, to a large degree, frail.
In Criminology, Social Theory and the Challenge
of Our Times’
‘take place in parallel with sociology’s re-readings
and reappraisals of the contemporary relevance of its founding or ‘classic’
texts (see
and that the important instance is that
‘ the opposition between (i)
a criminology that is interested in social and political theory, in reflexive
sociology of criminological knowledge and in the testing or transgressing of
disciplinary boundaries and ii) a criminology that has empirical bite and
strategic relevance – is an opposition that can no longer be sustained.’
Since this new situation has received virtually no
consideration no consideration, the assessment that social sciences have shown
less concern for crime being associated
to ethics and social philosophy than for other matters is valid. Contemporary
social science considers this as one of the most important characters of
post-or late-modern society. Insofar the validity of our assessment supposes
the complete ignorance of
‘the transition from modernity to late-modernity’
which ‘is clearly recognized and paralleled by a whole gamut of social commentations from all parts of the political spectrum’ ( Young 2003: 593)[11]
But this is only one of a set of conditions for the
validity of our assessment. Let us list them altogether: The observation that crime being associated
with ethical considerations has received less consideration in social sciences
than other issues is valid at the condition that
(i) crime, instead of
being defined as it is currently and traditionally was effectively defined,
i.e. as the privileged field of criminological analysis and research ( of
criminology and deviancy-theory ), is thought in accordance with the renewal of
public concern for ethics and as some social scientists have quite recently
suggested to think it: as a complex social problem that ‘has become much more
difficult to contain with the traditional bounds of criminological analysis’ ( Garland
& Sparks 2000: 199), which escapes from the criminological domination and
domestication and which constraints criminologists to re-invent their science
as a
‘figure that is located in other contexts and fields
of institutional settings’;
(ii) ) we do not acknowledge that crime, being
associated to ethics, is an issue which – however controversial the notion and
the debate about post-modernity (Young 2002: 593-613; Brodeur
1993: 73-120) in particular post-modern penal policy and criminal justice - has
become during the last decades increasingly important in the moralist rhetoric
of post or late-modern social sciences literature ( Garland & Sparks
2000:199-201), and that there is an increasingly ethical concern for issues of
crime, criminal law and criminal justice, which is strongly associated to the
growing importance of human right issues.
(iii) ethics, instead of being thought as it is currently thought in social
sciences, i.e. as of social reality, a sets of social facts – individual and or
collective acts/behavior being approved or disapproved and finally defined with
reference to good/bad, just/unjust, right/wrong - but as main concerns of a
particular branch of social science or philosophy (ethics) which would be aimed
to the investigation and analysis of judgments which approve / disapprove human
acts / behavior qualified as good/ bad, right / wrong, just /unjust;
(iv) ethics is thought either as of reflexive social
science – a meta-discourse of this part of social sciences’ discourse which provides
for comments and analysis of practical ethical concerns or as from a deontology
of social sciences, in particular criminology and deviance theory; that the
meaning of the notion is not reduced to applied or practical ethics (which is
only one area of ethics) and that the normative aspect of ethics) and that the
normative or prescriptive dimension of ethics is taken under account.
It is therefore clear that the actuality of ethics
and social philosophy is defined with reference to those fundamental processes
of social, political, economical – of cultural change which, in contemporary
social sciences, are currently thought and analyzed as of post or
late-modernity. And it is also obvious that social sciences and criminology are the children of their times
and that the transformations and processes of social production which are
characteristic for post-modernity determine, to a very large degree, the
institutional settings, the assumptions and paradigms, the intellectual
behavior of these sciences and finally the nature of the relation between these
sciences and their environment. And there is also evidence in this that this
journal, if it is launched, then because it is committed to play an active and
constructive role in the scientific - more precisely: the epistemological
program which consists in the invention
and construction of new ways and settings to think, reflect and analyze crime
and social control, and which is both the product of our times and the result
of a new scientific consciousness.
Emphatically, but truly: this journal is launched
because it is not a criminological journal – better: because it is not a
criminological journal in the traditional and current – exclusivist sense of
the term. It is launched as a major contribution to the construction and
development of post-modern criminological ethics or deontology. According to
As far as the epistemology of the project’s
historical dimension and target is concerned, it refers genuinely to Thomas
Kuhn’s shift of paradigm from internal to external history (Kuhn 1970) in this
that the clash of the bounds of traditional institutional settings and the
increasing precariousness and insecurity ‘of the intellectual strategies and
institutional assumptions that served earlier generations of
criminologists’(Garland & Sparks 2000) that have become less appropriate
today, are thought in a positive, constructive rather than negative way. They
may be viewed as elements which favor the deconstruction of disciplinary
identity and the construction of an epistemology which provides a focus on
contextualization – not as piece of evidence for a crisis that is not worth
being considered with disagreement, disillusion and complaint.[12] According to Thomas Kuhn,
this contextualization is the condition for the transformation of science from
a pure object or reality-science to a meta or self-observing science.
Let us now see how Garland and Sparks, in ‘Criminology, Social Theory And the Challenge of Our Times’ apply this program to criminology and how it is engendered in a criminological (deontological) ethics:
‘Criminology now has an opportunity - and a
responsibility - to engage public discourse in order to address a central issue
of our time. If it is to do so, it must
understand the terms in which these wider debates and discussions are being
discussed and how crime and crime control feature within them. It must also
develop self-consciousness about its intellectual assumptions and its social
situation, about all about its links to government and to culture.
Criminology’s fate is o be re-defined by the political culture of which it
forms a part. If it is t play a role in shaping its own future then
understanding that political culture will be an important firs step’ ( Garland
& Sparks 2000: 202).
And as far as the objective side of the
re-conceptualization is concerned:
‘It follows at least some of the intellectual
strategies and institutional assumptions that served earlier generations of
criminologists well have becoming less appropriate today. As we will discuss in
a moment, the social changes of the last few decades have already prompted a
rethinking of the assumptions that were characteristic in the middle years of
he century when academic criminology first developed as a specialism.
But some of our most contemporary habits of thought also need to be
reconsidered’ (
II
The COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUE:
ETHICS AS SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF ANALYSIS
Let us now
try to see how such an epistemological program, how such a criminological ethic
or deontology can apply to practical and theoretical issues. The best way to do
so is to apply this deontology to some key-proposals and core ideas inherent
within the analysis of post-modern society. In other words we will try to show
the extent to which this program applies to phenomena considered typical of
post-modernity. But we will also focus on the extent to which this program applies
to its original discursive context; in other words we will show the extant to
which this program may be viewed as Meta-critic. The articles published in this
first issue of our journal will be contextualized.
1.
Re-Conceptualization And Loss of Certainties, Erosion of oppositions And the
Frailty of Limits
We have
already acknowledged that for Garland and Sparks the re-conceptualization of
criminology is the epistemological answer to a situation where the traditional
opposition within criminology between reflexive sociology of criminological
knowledge and empirical criminology can no longer be sustained; and that this
process take place in parallel with sociology’s re-readings and reappraisal of
the contemporary relevance of its founding or ‘classics’. And we have noted
that this re-conceptualization is thought by those who advocate its necessity
as from constructivism. On this account, the concept of crime talk would apply
not only to other institutional settings and assumptions than that of criminology
(e.g. public opinion, government, etc), but also to criminology itself. This
means in other words that the constructivist nature of this concept cannot be
defined exclusively with reference to other than criminology, but it must also
be defined with reference to criminology and its traditional academic setting
and talk itself.
‘a sequences of relatively disconnected episodes’ (Vold and Bernhard 1986: 344. see also Young 1986: 4 - 310).
If there is need to apply the constructivist
approach to criminology, then this advocacy is valid not only for criminology
in general, but also for specific streams, schools or areas that were
traditionally distinguished and even for those figures of crime-talk which
developed within a specific stream, school or area –discourse and which were
traditionally thought as opposite or antagonistic talks.
1.-1 Criminology’s re-invention and
reappraisal of the contemporary relevance of its classic texts.
Among the articles published in this first issue of
our journal, there art two that are major contributions to the re-invention and
re-conceptualization of criminology:
By analogy to sociology’s ‘re-reading and
reappraisal of the contemporary relevance of its founding and classic texts’
(Sparks 1997, Turner 1996), Nicole
Rafter provides our lectures with re- reading and reappraisal of the
contemporary relevance of criminology’s founding or ‘classic’ text.. That what
is re-thought and re-invented here is not only the traditional lecture of Cesare Lombroso’s and his works,
not only the settings of understanding and interpretation that traditionally
prevailed, but also the relevance of Lombroso’s works
to contemporary criminological issues and finally the origins of criminology
and its history. As for the relevance of Lombroso for
contemporary criminology, acknowledge with Nicole Rafter that this pioneer of
criminology, in many regards, is also the pioneer and future-thinker of
contemporary biological criminology, of the process that, either in criminology
or criminal justice and criminal procedure, tends to supplant scientific,
namely biological and genetic certainties to that referring to norms and’ or to
social theory. There is increase in prison sur-population
and we have all acknowledged that prison administration is disappointed with
this situation and that there is a real requirement for a solution that
advocates the need for progressive ‘medicalization’
within the execution of the sanction; thus slogans like ‘ put the (‘real’)
criminals into prison and the pathological cases into hospital’ or ‘ crime –
prevention, to be successful, can no longer put aside biological and medical
means’ or even ‘ policing must more than ever before focus on ethnicity and
race’ has become during the last years increasingly prominent. It is therefore
clear that there is an ethical case for this issue and this part of
re-thinking; and there is an ethical case for the advantages ( for example the
development of a more scientific and therefore more objective within taking of
evidence) and the disadvantages (dissolution of normative legal certainties and
guarantees of liberty into scientific certainties) of the increasing importance
of science and technology within the criminal procedure as well as for
race-policing – not only because moral talk, by referring to human rights,
shows concern for this issue, but also because this moral- talk might be irrelevant
to the methods and proceedings of contemporary community policing.
By providing our lectures with a more contemporary
lecture of Lombroso’s works, Nicole Rafter
provides historical discussion of
criminology that is deviant in this that it supplants the concept of a
narrative and chronological talk of history to that of structure. But it is not
only in this point where she has snatched up the deontological part of this
program: by inventing a lecture of Lombroso that
focuses rather on his complex personality rather than on a stereo-typical
interpretation of his personal character
and by re-thinking the origins of criminology as from Lombroso
and not as sociologists and modern deviance-theorists use to do it – as from Quetelet and the ‘social hygiene movement’ she demonstrates
a persuasive case for a program within which intellectual deviance and deviant
talk is per definition a positive and constructive element.
‘What have we got to lose by stepping outside the
box?’ According to Randy Martin and his coauthors there is only one answer
to this question and this answer is clear: Nothing. This question is not a simple conclusion of a
substantial contribution to theoretical criminology; it is at the same time the
request rather than the invitation to go ahead with the re-invention of
criminology, not with its disinvention; and it is the
peak of an intellectual enterprise which, by referring to Wilber provides
criminology with a radical and original application of the new epistemological
program. Both the radical nature and the originality of this constructivist
deontology consist in the application of the postmodern epistemological program
to criminology. This is realized with reference and in accordance with Wilber’s
definition of the universe as being hierarchically arranged into four intrinsic
quadrants. Given the empirical premises of this major contribution to
theoretical criminology, it is clear that the radical nature and the
originality of this contribution derives at least from the practical
consequences of this deontology; it is both the substantial condition and the
means to finish with the biggest problems in contemporary criminology.
1.-2 Social change, transition and the culture
of criminology
Miroslav Scheinost’s ‘Criminology
in the
As for Diana Fenton, in her writing, she proposes a general
overview of deviance and she shows how deviance is influences by race,
ethnicity, culture and socio-economic status. The reappraisal of contemporary
approaches to crime and deviance is not only the means of the investigation of
this issue; it is also the epistemological condition for the acknowledgment of
the relation between crime talk and talks dealing with other issues, and of the
way these different talks interact. The interest of her investigation consists in
this that the analysis of this influence shows that and to which high degree
race, ethnicity and culture-talk has become inherent part in crime talk, in
particular criminological crime talk.
2. Crime-Complex And Renewal of Moralist Rhetoric: A
Meta-Critic
In ‘Criminology, Social Theory And The Challenge
of Our Time’,
This acknowledgment
requires for several observations:
1) For Garland and
Sparks ‘crime complex’ is a social phenomenon that, despite its psychological
nature, can neither be thought nor be defined independently from its social
environment and the objective social and economical conditions of its
production. As far as the notion of ‘crime complex’ expresses a mental state of
society or state of collective consciousness, it refers always to the objective
environment and conditions: on this account ‘crime-complex’ is defined with
reference to its social context and its objective conditions rather than with
reference to its subjective and psychological connotation. Thus
‘the combination of high rates of crime and the
failure of the criminal justice state produced a predicament for government
that has promoted the volatile and contradictory policies of the last two
decades. But more importantly, the experience of high crime rates as a normal
social fact has led to the formation of a distinctive culture that has grown up
around crime- a culture that changed the conditions in, which criminology and
criminal policy operate; This cultural formation which – might be called the
‘crime complex’ of late modernity – is characterized by a distinctive cluster
of attitudes, beliefs and practices. High crime rates are regarded as a normal
social fact and crime-avoidance becomes an organizing principle of everyday
life. Fear of crime is sufficiently widespread to become a political reference
point and crime issues are generally politicized and represented in motive
terms…This enforced engagement with crime and crime prevention tends to produce
an ambivalent reaction. On the one hand, a stoical adaptation that prompts the
development of new habits of avoidance and crime prevention routines. On the
other, a measure of irritation and frustration that prompts a more hostile
response to the danger and nuisance that crime represents in daily life’
(2000:200)
The circumstance that
2.-1 From
The first advantage
of Garland(s and Spark’s ‘crime-complex talk’ consists in this that its
re-lecture provides us with the possibility to link together the subjective
aspect of morals with the objective and material conditions of its production;
to clarify the relation between both and by doing this, to refer to Aristotle
and to show the actuality of his Nicomachean Ethics, but also its
relevance for the acknowledgment of the complex nature between ethics,
philosophy and crime. Thus we will understand why Aristotle is quoted at the
beginning of this essay.
Let us here come back
to our quote from Book II 1-3 NE. By acknowledging that
‘moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit
(ethos), and has indeed derived its nature, with a slight variation of form,
from that word’.
Aristotle stresses the material and objective aspect
of morals. According to its original understanding of the notion of ‘ethos’,
three different meanings can e distinguished: The notion denotes first the
habitual and usual place of residence or residence; second the customs and
habits and finally the moral conscience. At its origin the notion denotes the
usual place of residence; it is this original meaning of the notion. As for the
two other significations, they develop later. Indeed these three meanings
reflect different periods in the history of humanity, in particular the history
of human society. According to its authentic and original meaning, the word
‘ethos’, by denoting the usual residence, refers to the material relations
between humans; they are living in a certain area or place and their social
life is closely connected with and determined by this common area of residence.
In archaic societies there is lack of a morals (as a state of collective
consciousness) or of morally deplorable or desirable behavior. This
understanding of morals which is to all of us familiar develops later as the
result of a long process that is both the case and the principal motor for the
progressive detachment of morals from its original material context and
embedment. By the way note that the Greek words ‘syn-ethis’
and ‘syn-ethia’ denote the same
original material relation that exists between living together in a certain
place or area, habit and social custom can. Without the progressive detachment
of morals from their material and practical context, morals would not have
developed into a specific and autonomous area or category of social life; by
supplanting a theoretical understanding of morals to a more practical one, by
supplanting the embedment of morals in theory and philosophy to that of
material relation, this process can be thought as of the classic parade-example
for the social and objective conditions of the production of ethics: the social
understanding and conception of morals varies, and these variation and change
depends on the material conditions. The motto ‘every époque has its own morals’
is indeed familiar to all of us; it shows to which high degree the
acknowledgment of this relation is part of our collective consciousness. Here
is not the place to discuss in a detailed manner this issue; it will be the
focal center in upcoming issues of this revue. Let us simply acknowledge that
the history of ethics confirms the preceding observation. Thus the word
‘ethics’, being used as a synonym of moral philosophy or a specific part
inherent within philosophy, developed a result of the academic classification
of Aristotle’s texts; that Aristotle’s ethics, because of its practical
targets, must be thought as of the original discourse of practical philosophy
and that is both determined by and targeted to the development of the Greek
police; that the acknowledgment of justice and the education for justice is
according to Aristotle the focus and motor of such development and that it is
therefore clear that ethics as practical philosophy shows a major concern for
crime: that this original practical philosophy reflect the classical Greek
class–society based on slavery and that there is, from a modern ethical
viewpoint, obviously an ethical case for ethics based on the exclusion of
social classes from the life of the polis; that the idea of the equality of all
human beings, of the unity and universality of the human gender, of a universal
figure of right and of a world-citizenship – that the development of this
modern and top-actual issue in classical philosophy is simultaneous with the
progressive decline of the police-state and with the development of the
Alexandrian world-empire and that for Xenon, the most important protagonist of
this discourse, this empire is precisely the base and the objective condition
for the development of these ethics; that the shift of the ethical focal centre
from the political organization and structure of society ( polis and later the
Alexandrian Empire) to the human ego,
the individual consciousness, or even to a abstract reason (‘cosmos’) or a
transcendental divinity, clearly identified within skepticism and the later Stoa (Epictect) and in ancient
Christianity (strongly influenced by ‘late Stoa’ and
Platonism) is simultaneous with the decline of the classical antique social
order and the corresponding rational conception of ethics.
On this account the acknowledgment that the renewal
of ethics is together with the journal’s contribution to this renewal somehow
the ‘child’ of post-modern society is a quite banal observation. And when, as
In all accounts there is an ethical case for the
talk which things morals as of a simple figure of rhetoric and for which
‘renewal of moral rhetoric’ has become an ethically problematic case.
Let us first of all discover the nature of ethics to
which this scientific moral talk about post-modern crime, penal policy and
politics belong and refer. According to
‘also brought in its wake new disorders and
dislocations – above all new levels of crime and insecurity. The political reaction
of the 1980 and 1990s has shaped the public perception of the troubling issues,
persuading us to think of them as problems of control rather than welfare: as
the outcome of misguided social programs, as result of an amoral permissiveness
and lax family discipline encouraged by liberal elites who were sheltered from
their worst consequences; as the irresponsible behavior of a dangerous and
undeserving underclass – people who abused the new freedom and made life
impossible for the rest of us’( 2000:199).
2.-2 The morals pf modern criticism.
Advantages, Disadvantages and Disappointment
The moral of this passage is that the political
reaction of the 1980s and 1990s has provided public opinion with a ‘moralist’
superficial construction of crime and insecurity. The talk of moral breakdown
is the ‘, falsely represented by this reaction as the invention of liberal
elites, is part of the hypocrite and superficial reactionary ideology.
On what side are the criticizers of this reactionary
ideological are? – Obviously not in the reactionary camp, but on the side of
the enlightened and humanist liberal elites, the same which are the proud
fabricants and the certain defenders of liberal, humanist discourse – the aware
protectors and diligent administrators of tolerance, liberty, equality and
freedom, those who have the moral obligation to demonstrate disappointment
about
‘the
dramatic change of the rules of political speech and of the relationship
between politicians, the public and the system’s professionals’ (2000:200);
who feel that
they have the moral duty to acknowledge that
‘the
primary themes of the new penal politics – the expression of punitive sentiment
concern
for victims, public protection, exclusion enhanced control – are also routed in
a reactionary thematisation of ‘late modernity’,
prompted not just by rising crime, but by the whole reactionary current of
recent politics (2000:200),
and who are revolted against a current that
‘characterizes
the present in terms of moral breakdown, incivility and decline of the family,
and urges the reversal of the ‘Sixties’ revolution and the cultural and
political liberation that it ushered in (2000:200).
On all these’ accounts, this moral talk can hardly
be thought as of a master-piece of post-modern thought; rather it is a
brilliant advocacy for modern ethics. And given the actual state of society and
penal politic, it is difficult to disagree with
.
As we have noted before the epistemological program
of
Why should governments and penal-politicians be
concerned with public crime talk and all these issues? Principally for two
major reasons. And these two reasons are opposite, and in this opposition is
engendered an ethical conflict. The first reason is that governments and
penal-politicians must be concerned with such issues in order to prevent
themselves from dealing with them I an irrational, emotional rather than
rational manner, and from making populist (crime) politics; this first reason
refers to a modern conception of legitimacy and legitimization of governance,
law making and penal politics. This conception is, accordingly to Habermas (1978: 1981; 1984) a rational conception, And they
must show concern for these issues just because otherwise their decision-making
would be devoid of any rationality and objectivity. Insofar the rational
conception of legitimacy and legitimization is also and always a scientific
conception. The second reason is that governmental institutions must show
concern for these issues because the population itself has increasing concern for
them, because citizens are really concerned with these issues, not because
there is need for populist politics prevention. Both reasons can be thought
as the narrative of modern democracy,
and they are both legitimate with regards to modern democracy. Moreover in both
cases the rationales are inherent within a discourse where security and liberty
are closely connected one to each other. Emphatically we can stress their
difference as follows: the second reason would refer to a discourse that
provides for the primacy of security upon liberty – security is here the
condition for liberty (Hobbes) -, whereas the first one would rather provide
for the inverse case (Rousseau).
It is therefore clear that those who emphasize the
first rationale would automatically de-emphasize the second, and inversely. As
we have seen already
What happens when the liberty rationale is
hyper-emphasized? Concerns for security tend then to become a case for populism
– an artificial construction which is inherent part in that which, according to
the morals advocated by
The fundamental ethical problem that is engendered
in security issues, in particular security and safety policy being associated
or referring to he feeling of insecurity is raised with the question whether
and to which degree a rationalist conception of legitimacy and legitimization
can be thought as from an absolute principle; whether and to which degree the
application of this conception to issues that show a strong emotional
coloration is practically possible and politically and ethically desirable. And
which are the normative references and parameters on which depends the final
choice? How to define them, and who?[15]
3. Cultural Essentialism, Theocratic Fascism,
Multiculturalism and The Limits of Modern Critical Crime -Talk
We have previously referred to the necessity for
scholarly distinction between ‘multiculturality’ and ‘multiculturalism’. In our
discussion about the French ‘headscarf affaire’ we have also observed the
relevance of this distinction to ethics. There is a moral duty in this clear
distinction.
According to Floya Anthias’ ‘multiculturality’ is
‘the removal of barriers to the legitimacy of
different ways of being and is not dedicated to reproduction. Multiculturality
goes along with both hybridity and assimilation.
Neither is to be feared a loss or a demise of a group although assimilation is
an ideology and practice of forced acculturation and therefore deeply delegitimizing’ (1995: 298)
whereas
‘multiculturalism
focuses on the reproductive process of culture rather than the transformative
ones’ (1995:298).
Since multiculturalism is often thought of as a
figure of cultural essentialism and the analysis of this complex relation
expressed in Jock Young’s ‘Late Modernity And The Dynamics of Social
Exclusion’ (2002) stipulates a very high degree of intellectual pertinence.
‘Multiculturalism’ and ‘cultural essentialism’ are considered phenomena that
are characteristic for late-modern society. More than simple notions, they are
inherent core slogans within the critics of post-modernity. As far as their
significance is concerned, they refer to what Antonio calls the renewal of
anachronistic forms of social life, being associated with 'reactionary
tribalism' and ‘auto-referential culture’. This is often viewed as the most
important practical consequence of the recurrent theoretical feeling which
emphasizes the fight against modernity and the categorical refusal of
universals (Antonio 2001: 40 - 87)[16]. According to Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis (1995), the renewal of
anachronistic tendency is considered a transformation that supplants
‘biological essentialism by that of cultural
essentialism’ (Young 2000: 605).
Given the circumstance that
the inclusivist rhetoric
had as its progressive moment the stress on way in which biological differences
(whether of ‘race’, ‘gender’ or of age) the inclusivist
rhetoric had as its progressive moment the stress on way in which biological
differences (whether of ‘race’, ‘gender’ or of age) were not rooted in any
essential difference, but were social product” (Young 2000:60; se also Bauman
195:188)[17],
it is clear that ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘cultural
essentialism’ are in the critics of postmodernism synonymous with the collapse
of the inclusivist model.
Despite the diversity of critical literature on post-modernity, the analysis provides for conclusions that converge[18]. This convergence is clearly identified within the critical discourse of late-modern penal and security politics and policy. Thus the acknowledgment that
‘Essentialism provides a cultural basis for conflict
and is the necessary prerequisite for demonisation of
parts of society. Demonization is important in that
it allows the problems of society to be blamed upon others’ usually perceived
as being on the ‘edge’ of society. (Jock Young 2003)
must be thought as a leitmotiv of critical
literature, all the more so as the these critiques converge in this that they
think multiculturalism and cultural
essentialism as from the societal reaction against ontological insecurity; but
as a means to ‘secure’ ontological insecurity. The motto is that cultural
essentialism, because of the contradiction inherent within it, has the
paradoxical effect to favor inter-ethnical conflict and insecurity, with the demonisation of the other as its most important practical
consequence. In this analytical context, the solution to the problem of
ontological insecurity and to inter-ethical conflict becomes devolved to the
enforcement of the fight against illegal immigration as if
‘it were a cosmetic problem
rather than rising out of the interior
structure and values of society itself;’( Young 2002:606, Young 1997; Baratta
1996).
The advantage of such explanation and interpretation
offers a view of cultural essentialism that is contextualized. The problem of
security is thought and defined as a cultural or general social problem rather
than with reference to crime and policy. Thus crime becomes synonymous with
criminalization as means to displace the real problem, not as means to resolve
it. Obviously the force of this approach derives from its radical nature. But
at the same time it engenders its fallacy. The acknowledgement that social
problems are increasingly ‘resolved’ by means of criminalization, that
criminalization and penal politics are means of demonisation
and that both the social and legal blame usually apply to those being perceived
at the edge of society is empirically relevant. Moreover further development of
this issue would be a major contribution to the development of the paradigm of
the economical causes and origins of crime. Nonetheless crime, even if it is
thought with reference to cultural essentialism, cannot be reduced to
criminalization as means of demonisation, nor is it
possible to generalize the acknowledgment that social and legal blame is
usually applied to those being perceived at the edge of society. Such
generalization would provide a focal centre on ‘crime in the streets’, ‘crime
in the suites’ being put aside
(Sack 1994: 150). Is crime the privilege of
economically and socially marginalized, disintegrated classes? Are the poor
rather disposed to commit crime than the rich? It is therefore clear that such
generalization damages the theoretical, in particular the economical background
to which this scheme refers. Thus this leftist discourse would become
counter-productive; finally it would play the game of the ‘selective’ and
‘reactionary’ penal politics which it criticizes.
A view of crime derived from cultural essentialism
cannot be reduced to criminalization as means of demonisaton
of the ‘other’, because cultural essentialism supposes per definition demonisation, exclusion, blame and rejection of the other
by means of racial, ethical or even religious identity; it cannot be reduced to
criminalization because cultural essentialism constitutes an offence against
the fundamental values of modern liberal democracy. Thus it can be thought as
criminal; insofar it is worth being criminalized. By providing a focal centre
on criminalization as means of demonisation, the real
demoniac and criminal nature of cultural essentialism is not only put aside,
but it is also the result of a superficial demoniac criminalization. The
fallacy of such approach is not only its epistemological inconsistence but also
its ethical deficiency. It is epistemologically inconsistent, because
criminalization is a paradigm that is genuinely inherent within the modern
criminological crime talk and refers to selective criminalization and social
and legally constructed injustice. It supposes multiculturality and an inclusivist model of society and it refers to the
principles of liberty, equality and tolerance. It is therefore clear that it
cannot be applied to cultural essentialism. As for the ethical deficiency, if
not the morally deplorable nature of such crime talk, it engenders in a
discourse which transform the demon Bin Laden into the victim of occidental demonisation; thus the fascist becomes the victim of ‘
demonic
In this issue Simon Cottee
advocates the intellectual and moral inconsistence of this construction. His ‘The
Worship of Unreason, September 11 and the Forces of Theocratic Fascism’
provides our lectures with a substantial analysis of the cultural and political
background of the September 11 event, its cultural significance, and with a
substantial critic of stereotypical sets of interpretation, either left or conservative
right wing, The originality of his essay prompts us to consider the
significance of the event with reference to a civilization clash within the
Islamist world rather than to adopt the more prominent scheme that advocates
the clash between Islamic and Occidental culture.
Given the prominence of the crime talk which
transforms the authors into victims and the victims into authors; given the
epistemological inconsistence and the ethical deficiency of this construction,
it might be argued that the clash within intellectual occidental culture would
be an exact match with the clash within the Islamic civilization. After all the
modern ‘lecture’ of archaism and theocratic fascism which is at the base of the
moral crime talk plays the game of Theocratic Fascism.
4. Exlusion And Inequality.
‘In my opinion
an important integrative “criminogenic” (in general “delictogenic”) factor is the fundamental contradiction
between the relatively even distribution of human demands and the inequality in
the existing opportunities to satisfy these demands, depending first of all on
a person’s position in the social structure; the more significant this rupture,
the lower the responsiveness of society (its capacity to meet people’s demands,
as understood by A. Etzioni), the higher of deviance
level, including crime.’
And Yakov Gilinskiy acknowledges in his essay ‘Problems of Inclusion and Exclusion in Contemporary
These core proposals of Yakov
Gilinskiy’s essay are easily identified as inherent
parts within the modern critical sociological crime / deviance talk, but also
as master-pieces of economical crime talk. These two core-proposals are somehow
the focus of an analysis that demonstrates this discourse’s relevance – however
problematic and controversial its generalization and its application to
specific areas and phenomena of postmodern society might be – to the
understanding and the explanation of social problems, in particular deviance.
The essay’s merit and originality resides in its general validity as tested in
a specific Russian Context. The contextualization of this critical sociological
modern deviance talk provides a welcome opportunity to test the validity of the
radical approach that is inherent in this critical modern discourse. It is
therefore obvious that Yakov Gilibskiy’s
essay must be thought as an incitation for criminologists and social theorists
to develop upcoming analysis, providing a focal centre on the complex relation
between, crime, anomie, social change, economical and social inequality and
practical social philosophy, but also as an requirement for empirical testing
of economic crime talk and sets of interpretation that are inherent .within
social theory and practical philosophy, either modern critical or more
conservative or post-modern. One of the most important challenges of
contemporary social sciences is to test the empirical relevance of these
theoretical settings of crime talk, in particular those that are inherent
within the works of Durkheim, Polaniy,
Habermas and Mesmer &
Rosenfeld.
[1] This reappraisal is the result of an interpretation that focuses on the difference between the works of the young Marx and those of the older. Such an interpretation, by focusing on the antagonistic structure of Mark works, developed during the 1960s in the Western democratic world. The scheme is an inherent part of neo-Marxist and critical theory’s attempt to get back in touch with Marxism and to provide Marxism by means of a theoretical re-conceptualization with a more humanist dimension. It must be thought as a result of the traditional Left’s disillusion and disappointment about historical materialism and the Communist totalitarian experience. Later the scheme is snatched up by conservative critics of Marx, providing a focal center on the inherent contradiction within Marx’s oeuvre. See on this subject for example the re-lecture by François Furet of Marx’s analysis of the French Revolution in Furet’s and Calvie’s Marx et le Révolution Française (1986)
[2] See for this opinion and a fundamental discussion of this issue the book of F. Furet & F. Liniers ‚ Terrorisme et démocratie’ ( 1985)
[3] F. Fukuyama,
[4] Here is not
the place to discuss in detail this issue. To support this observation it is
always useful to acknowledge with Benedict Kingsbury ( 2002:401-36)
‘ that the vitality of mainstream positivist traditions
in international law has been sustained by a deeply felt commitment to the
ethical view that legal positivism provides the best means for international
lawyers to promote realization of fundamental political and moral values.’
It is this
assessment that forms the starting point and the guide-line of the ethical
lecture which Kingsbury proposes in his essay ‘Legal Positivism as Normative
Politics: International Society, Balance of Power, and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive International Law’. Such lecture –
however strange – suggests drawing an analogy with Hans Kelsen’s
Legal Theory. As Oppenheim held that positive
international law has no concern for ethics and morals, so did Kelsen. And yet Kelsen’s comments
and developments show clearly that ethical considerations are at the origin of
his pure legal theory and that, for Kelsen, the
legitimacy of the positivist theory is an ethical case. See on this subject for
example Jelic (2001:551-570)
[5] According to F. Anthias multiculturality involves diversity, cultural penetration and hybridity, whereas multiculturalism difference, reproduction and enslavement. ( 1995: 298)
[6] Concern, if
not disappointment and disapproval about
[7] Of which the most convincing is in our opinion the argument that the requirement for cultural difference refers to a context of multiculturalism rather than to multiculturality; thus those who advocated the legitimacy of headscarf in the name of multi-cultural society would have somehow used an ideological strategy that was aimed to the multicultural concealment of multiculturalism ( its genuine reference)
[8] See on this controversial issue Jürgen Habermas’ article ' La statue et les révolutionnaires', published in the journal Le Monde (2003 / 0503). Contra Pierre Pesactore’s La carence du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, published in Le Monde 2003 / o513.
[9] When the affaire of the legal consequences
of the construction of Israel’s security - wall in the territory is referred to
the International Court of Justice; when the same Court is requested for
advisory opinion and when the great majority of the nations of the democratic
and liberal world deny the Court the competence to give an advise in a
political affaire or a genuinely Israeli security issue then there is not only
a legal case for International Justice, but also an ethical case for the
Court’s legal competence.
A similar observation might apply to UN’s peace and security mission; the circumstance that the great majority of the member-States of the UN’s Security Council are not democratic and liberal ones might indeed be morally deplored.
[10] The authors continue as follow: Indeed
such is a centrality of many criminological issues to the social organization,
governance and everyday life of contemporary societies that these activities of
reappraisal cannot really be thought of as separate.( In addition to the essays
collected here , see Taylor 1999, Young 1999, Bauman19 98, Garland 2001).’
[11] To support his observation the author ( 2003, p. 593 note 1) provides a large sets of examples: ″ See for example , on the left, David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity ( 1989) and Eric Hobsbam’s The Age of extremes ‚1994), from the right James O. Wilson’s Thinking about crime ‚ 1985) and On Character (1994), )while from the communitarian third way Ammitai Etzioni’s The New Golden Rule ( 1997) and Francis Fukuyama’s Great Disruption ‚ 1999).“
[12] But yet this
is, it seems, the way mainstream criminology has reacted against this new
situation. On his issue and for a critical comment see
[13] ’ By modern
criminology’, Garland & Sparks acknowledge, ‘we mean the frameworks of
problems, concepts and style of reasoning that emerged at the end of the 19th
century, produced by the confluence of medical psychology, criminal
anthropology statistical enquiry social reform and prison discipline – a
framework that provided the coordinates for the penal – welfare institutions
that developed during the next seventy years (Garland 18985). Modern
criminology is no longer quiet up to the minute, but it was a formative
hegemonic discourse for the first two-thirds of this century. For all their
disagreements, the founders of modern criminology were all proponents of this
basic framework. Hermann Mannheim as LSE, Max Grunhut
at Oxford, Leon Radzinowics at Cambridge, Tom Lodge
at the Home Office, Edward Glower and Emmanuel Miller, who, along with Mannheim
founded the British Journal of Delinquency, the forerunner to the British
Journal of Criminology – all of them shared the same basic commitments. (A
reading of American criminology up to and including the President’s Crime
Commission Report (1967) reveals similar themes). And although subsequent
generations would revise its terms and question its commitments, this version
of criminology paid a crucial role in establishing the discipline in the
academy, in government and in popular culture’.( Garland& Sparks
2000:193-94)
And
furthermore in their essay, the same authors note:
‘With its faith in instrumental reason, its vision of the technocratic state and its commitment to social progress and social engineering, this criminology was emphatically modernist. Punishment in general, and retributive punishment in particular were viewed as irrational and counterproductive, as remnants of pre- modern practices, based upon emotion and superstition’…’ The proper management of crime and criminals required individualized corrective measures adapted to the specific case or the particular problem. For modern criminology crime was a social problem that, presented in the form of individual, criminal acts These criminal acts, or at least those which appeared serious, repetitive or irrational were viewed as symptoms of ‘ criminality and delinquency’ ( p; 194)
[14] Sir Leon Radzionowicz’s expresses his disappointment as follows:
‘What I find profoundly disturbing is the gap between
‘criminology’ and ‘criminal policy’, between the study of crime and punishment
and the actual mode of controlling crime…;The stark fact stands out that, in
the field of criminal justice, in spite of the output of criminological
knowledge, a populist political approach holds sway.’ (Radzionowizs
1999:469)
And
‘And Sir
And furthermore:
‘Elsewhere R ‘ 1997) has written about ‘Penal
Regressions, giving the sense of the reversal of a developmental pattern – a
system that has been maturing, becoming more civilized, more modernized, has
suddenly regressed. Its development has been arrested, its evolution blocked.
This rather unexpected reversal and the disparity between criminology(s success
in the academy and its declining role in public life – particularly in national
penal policy- provides us with the problem through which we can think about
criminology’s development over the last hundred years.’
[15] With the question whether and to which degree security and safety policing, by focusing on crime prevention, might be thought as an appropriated means to increase the citizen’s feeling of security is raised another major ethical problem. We have already acknowledged that the feeling of insecurity has become a principal motor for the development of security politics and policy, although it shows a strong emotional nature. But it would be a fundamental error to believe that that strong emotional coloration would be denied of any objective references. The real problem is the nature of these objective references, their relationship and their distribution. In other words is crime the exclusive reference for the feeling of insecurity, is it the major or fundamental part within these objective references or are other aspects that play a more important role are involved? According to a current in contemporary criminological literature, the felling of security refers partly to crime, partly it refers to transformations and change within the immediate environment of the individual and its perception (ecological environment, unemployment added to a great density of immigrants (Albrecht 1997: 147-65. Cf. Kury 1997: 166-217). Partially is it the result of the individuals‘ subjective evaluation of the risk of victimization A correlation between these two aspects must not necessarily exist (Kury 1997) and a confusion between both cannot be excluded. It is therefore clear that there is an ethical case for the application of safety and security policy to other social problems than crime, all the more so as these policies are targeted to crime prevention. On the other hand there is we cannot ignore that, as Garland & Sparks have acknowledged, that the increasing feeling of insecurity is closely connected to increasing crime rates: that the evaluation of the risk to become a victim, despite its subjective nature is closely connected with he state of crime and that the illegal statute of immigrants is a factor of social and economical disintegration, destabilization and marginalization – finally a factor that favors deviance and crime. On this account Governments’ increasing concern for insecurity is morally and politically legitimate ( see ( Silverman 2002: 2001a; 2001; Gilly 2o03: 85-102; 1998: 154 - 168. Roché 1998, 151 - 256. Kury 1997).
[16] Antonio
Robert J. After Postmodernism: Reactionary Tribalism. American Journal of
Sociology. Volume 106, Number 1 July 2000 40 - 87 where the author puts that:
“The idea of auto - referential culture one of the most usually debated facets of the post
modernization holds that culture
operates according to its own autonomous logic, free from modern theory’s formative sociological
substrates ( e.g. Durkheim’s consciousness or Marxist
class values). This view emphasizes a split between the signifier and signified
(I.e. a symbolic codes lack shared conceptual and external referents of common
meaning and object) and consequent semiotic determinism.”(p. 50). The postulate
of auto - referential culture constitutes only one aspect of auto - reference:
In contemporary system - theory, in particular those developed by Parsons and
more recently by Luhmann, auto-reference was
developed as an inherent aspect in auto referential systems; it was thought of
as autopoïesis. See on this subject: Salvaggio, S.-.A. , Barbesino,
P.: Autopoietic Systems Theory and the System of
Science. In: Salvaggio (ed.), Collected papers on Niklas Luhmann / Articles choisis autour de N. Luhmann.
Information sur les Sciences Sociales. SAGE
Publications.
[17] Given the
circumstance that ‘the inclusivist rhetoric had as
its progressive moment the stress on way in which biological differences (
whether of ‘race’, ‘gender’ or of age) were not rooted in any essential
difference, but were social product’ ( Young 2000:605)
[18] Thus
Antonio’s analysis can be thought as from the traditional left; insofar it is
an inherent part of the modern critical narrative, providing a focal-centre on
the traditional inclusivist model, privileging the
primacy of universals over particulars. In contrast with this traditional inclusivist discourse from the traditional left, the
discourse developed by Baumann, but also by Jock Young, by claiming fort he
deconstruction of the conventional notion of multiculturalism, analyses as an
inherent critic in multiculturalism rather than a critic of multiculturalism.
By criticizing the essentialist alienation of multiculturalism, this discourse
would no longer refer closely to the traditional inclusivist
rhetoric. Or, both provide for similar conclusions.
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By Thomas Gilly
I thank Professor Eli Silverman for his precious help and advices