Reflex Approach in the Drive Against Terrorism : Proportionality of Counteraction Measures

By Vladimir Iliev

Abstract

This article is devoted to the pragmatic use of reflex in setting up proportionality as a guideline for decision making, strategic planning and concrete action in cases of terrorist activities that imply hostage taking. The paper discusses the impact of the reflex approach upon those actions that are undertaken by diverse authorities and security agents in order to overcome situations of extreme stress and crisis by means op appropriate and proportional stress and crisis management.The challenge lies in the relevance of social reflex action against crime and terrorism for proportional reactions against terroris. The structure of the social reflex action is analyzed. Some examples of low reflex reaction against terrorist threats and attacks are provided. The main features of a stress-situation, the behaviour of negotiating countries, the management of terrorist reactions in terms of the reflex approach are analyzed.

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Key words: proportionality, social reflection, terror, hostages, risk, deviation, conflict.

Introduction: Proportionality as a Kind of Social Reflex Action against Crime

All sorts of reaction against crime stem from the notion of crime, as it develops on the ground of our perception, definition and finally on our construction of crime... Setting up such general notions is a complicated and long process. Culture and convenience, but also collective experience, ethics and supporting normative settings are involved in that process.

Although some periods of stagnation and sometimes, of course, of regression, through the mechanism of reflex, went hand in hand with the process of the crime notion construction, the fact that the latter has come into existence can hardly be questioned. The notion of crime in all its various forms exists. Social reflex is a generalized and analysed sum of information received in course of the process we call social cognition. This generalized information has got a systematic nature. From the point of view of reflexive social cognition, it is part of a complicated system of a double level order. The system, at the first level, states genuinely facts and regularities of social cognition, the second level notes and recognizes complicated phenomena of cognition analysis.

It is obvious that proportionality impacts on the system’s second level - which registers and determines the whole gamut of complicated relations and interactions that develop in reaction against crime and that are involved in the complex social phenomenon of crime. The original meaning of the word proportionality refers to mathematics where it denotes the relation between two variables whose ratio is the same. If we apply that paradigmatic use and meaning of the word proportionality to the crime phenomenon, it is then that proportionality Proportionality is the relation between two variables – the objective status of crime, onj the one hand, and the reaction against crime, on the other hand.. As for the common ration of these two variables it might consist either of a quantitative or a qualitative correlation. Suppose we have to do with a very high number of murder. In quantitative terms the relation between that very high crime rate and the reaction against crime can be thought of as a proportional relation from the moment on when the reaction against that high crime rate is itself a high reflex action. For example a wage of hate crimes flews over the members of a given community or ethical group. In reaction the community or ethnic group requires for more protection, appropriate law enforcement and severe punishment. The reaction is in proportion to both the victimimization of the community / ethnic group (number of real victims and risk of victimization) and the increase in the number of hate crimes. Analogically we are tempted to argue that death penalty, if it were applied to people who do not respect dfense to smoke in public spaces would be disproportionate to the severity of the offense.

In both cases the reaction is proportionate if it corresponds exactly, either on the quqntitative or the qualitative level with the Number of offenses/ severity of the severity of theoffense.

Given the circumstance that difference and divergence in time, space, society, culture and religion imply different and heterogeneous stand-points in regards to those actions which fit the best in with the inherent requirements of the drive against crime, proportionality itself can never be considered as an absolute, is always relative.. An appropriate action is an action that is defined with reference to and taken in accordance with the "necessary and appropriate proportionality". Accordingly the “necessary and appropriate proportionality’ is itself a matter of controversy. The answer to the question: what is a proportionate action against crime?, varies itself as a function of the difference and variety of stand-points. The same observation applies to the question: From when on the drive against crime is proportionate to the security requirement? ..

Experience teaches that a reaction which is proportionate from the viewpoint of somebody is disporoprtionate in the eyes of another individual.The same observation applies to the penalty. However, the reaction against crime, at that basic analytical level, holds almost always a social disease. What is central to that disease is “inadequate proportionality”. Obviously the legal system as well as collective cognitive processes set limits to the spreading of non adequate proportionality. Accordingly the relativity of proportionality as it is involved in the reaction against crime, is somehow counter-balanced by that what is central to the reaction, i.e social desease. Why? It is simply because the latter provides consistence and continuity to the relativity and frailness of proportionality. It works to the profit of homogeneity in a field that demonstrates contingency and heterogeneity. However such homogeneity suffers a great number of exceptions. Maybe the most eloquent example is the controversy about the death penalty. In some places it is accepted, but in others it is energetically rejected. Abortion, genetic engineering, and use of non-traditional methods to influence people, etc are other examples. The question that is central to all these cases is whether such practices and methods, if they were applied, are proportionate to their aim or not? .

The question of proportionality in the drive against crime is genuinely a modern question Among the reasons that contribute to the explanation of his particular phenomenon, social change comes in front That change as well as the transformation of the structure of the social space affected in a decisive manner many of the western societies - at the end of the 20^th century and at the beginning of the 21^st century. Due to that social change, risk, deviance and conflict impact all aspects of our everyday life. To its largest extent,, risk, deviance and conflict are central to a new existential condition, they are no longer considered as not normal, and they cannot be considered as exceptions either. However it would be an error to believe or to acknowledge that such a social change could come into existence independently from the inherent cognitive processes in modernity which impacted in a substantial manner moden peoples’ perception of modernity and modern peoples’ belief in progress and in emancipation as it evelops on the ground of modern culture and Enlightenment. It could be that the “risk society” is a pattern that stems genuinely from cognitive processes that developed within the frame of modern culture,, not by virtue of substantial change in modern society. After all, in comparaison to the extremely risky archaic societies and the, pre-modern societies of The Classical and the Middle Age, our modern societies are to be thought of as low risk societies. What is involved in modern collective cognition and experience is the optimistic attitude towards modernity as a means to develop progress, control, emancipation and safety. On the contr ary, the catastrophes of the 20^th century, the collapse of the traditional value and ideological systems, mass mobilioty, social change, anomie etc have undopubtadly disturbed such an optimistic vision. Although the death risk or the risk to become a victim of a crime, as it is specific to our post-modern societies, is, from an objective viewpoint, infinitively lower than it was in archaic or premodern societies, we are tempted to perceive that risk as very high. In fact our perception and experience of risk is proportionate to the lose of the – however listening dream of the promises of modernity. .

Are we willing to engage in social management? Is it a suitable and realistic option to turn the society into an actor of positive correction? All depends pn our willingness and ability to adapt to live under conditions of risk, deviation and conflicts. It is then that social reflex, by producing appropriate reaction against crime, is becomes a very important cultural and communicative means to survive and to reach the goal of social development. Reflexive culture is an important part of the culture for life management. Life management by means of social reflex implies our willingness and our capability to develop and to implement drive against crime strategies, both at the level of the individual and at the level of the society...

The structure of social reflex action against crime defines the level of proportionality of counteraction. It consists of three elements:

• Risk reflex
• Deviance-reflex
• Conflict - reflex

“Mimesis” is central to social reflex. It is because social reflex can be thought of as a sorts of knowledge and of understanding, as it develops on the ground of the process that enables us to put ourselves at the place of the other, to suppose and think as if we were the other. In sum, social reflex is knowledge by means of the process that engage us to mime the other. In this respect, crime is the phenomenon’s most important feature..

Tthe reflex approach to crime risk consist of the following basic elements::

1. Reconstruction of the causes of crime or the particular criminal act
2. Discovery of the mechanisms of crime development
3. Prognosis of acts / behaviour, causing social risk at crime execution
4. Manipulation of criminal acts – seeking for ways to supplant the inherent death risk in crime by alternatives;
5. Development of linkages between crime risk and the environment - for example seasons, temperature changes, geomagnetic storms, full moon etc.

To be successfully applied, reflex action against crime and deviance,requires an innovative approach to the perception of crime. The innovation consists in clearly distinguishing between. the posisitive crime connotation (for example.” the genius”) and the negative one (for example. the criminal). Indeed in ever day life both are often confused and both are mobile in time and space. For argument’s The “genius criminal” has developed into a real popular myth which is predisposed towards crime apologi.. The daily routine, indisputably, is not a coloured comic and things are much more prosaic - criminals are criminals and talents - talented. On that account, such sorts of reflex action against crime and deviance might be considered as “deviant reflex”. However, it is very important to understand that the maxim: Deviant behaviour shall always be examined from multiple and different standpoints and positions sfould always be the guideline. This is the price we have to pay in order to get, in a creative process, adequate proportionality towards crime.

Crime constantly causes social conflicts of different type and structure. By studying carefully social conflicts, as they develop on the ground of crime, we can define the need for as well the level of proportional reaction against crime and conflict in an appropriate manner.

It is important to note that proportionality should always result from the analysis of the three elements composing the social reflex structure against crime: risk-reflex, deviance-reflex and conflict-reflex.

, In this regard terrorism can be thought of as a real paradigm: Terrorism presents the following characteristic aspects: it is a massive social risk, it demonstrates criminal deviance and it holds an acute social conflict with wide ranging repercussions. Despite the efforts that have been undertaken – worldwide, in order to adjust the effective and uncompromising drive against terrorism, it would be an error to deny that some types of low reflex, at the level of one of the three components (risk, deviance and conflict) or regarding altogether might impede the adjustment process in the drive against terrorism. What does it mean?

Firstly, there are cases of low reflex action against the inherent risks of terrorism. For example, when we speak about terrorism, either as a phenomenon endangering a personality, or in the other case - only a country, our terrorism speech holds low social reflex. To preclude the impeding factors, there is need to develop a very good preventive communication strategy that consists ideally in informing the public about terrorism’s global threat. The communicative goal is reached when the public acknoleges that terrorism threats not only the whole society, but also the existence of the individual and increasingly the environment..

Secondly, there are cases of low reflex action towards terrorism when the perpetrators are taken as "fighters for justice or freedom”, “courageous defenders of certain cause", "flustered people" etc. It is necessary to point at the fact that perpetrators are not only high level criminals but also people that demonstrate the top level of criminal deviance. It is imperative to understand that low reflex action, in such cases, is never more than a hypocrite arrangement for “proportional” reaction working to the profit of the terrorist and to the detriment of the society. In fact it is disproportional.

A third series of examples of low reflex deals the conflict nature of a terrorist act. In this regard the attitude that consists either in minimizing or complexly ignoring the social impact of the conflict or in hyper emphasizing the conflict’s impact upon society as well as its far reaching repercussions is symptomatic and highly eloquent. To better understand the point which is common to both cases of low reflex, let us use a metaphor. In the first case our reflex is limited to the stone that is thrown into the water only, it is not in proportion with the waves caused by the fall of the stone. In the second case our reflex refers genuinely to the waves, at a point that we might miss the stone. Here again our reflex is disproportional.

In the drive against terrorism, negotiation for hostages’ liberation is a very important topic. In the following we will discuss the reflevance of reflex action to that specific case.

Within the framework of that special topic social reflex demonstrates its ability to contribute in a substantial manner to the development of proportional reaction against crime. The question of how the use of social reflex generates adequate proportionality in the drive against crime is central to the discussion. .

Approaches to Reflex Action against Terrorism.The Case of Negotiations for Hostages' Liberation

Terror is an utmost form of violence against a particular individual or a group. There are two major approaches within the framework of reflex analysis as a means of terrorism counteraction - the "hard" and the "soft"... The hard approach is an attitude that lacks in compromise... Its features are: refusal of negotiating, refusal of concessions, fast and aggressive counteraction involving physical force and the use of firearms...

On the contrary, negotiation is central to the "soft” / “flexible” approach. In general negotiation is used as a means to reach a compromise and to reduce the escalation potential of the conflict. Negotiation is inherent part in the strategy that is aimed at the development of alternative ways that work in favour of conflict solution with a peaceful outcome...

In some particular cases each of both might be relevant. For argument’s sake, at the rising of certain incidents, it might be opportune to choose either the one or the other, regardless to the strategy that has been initially approved by the authorities of a given country. For example the authorities that have adopted a hard liner strategy, might, at a given moment, rather prefer the flexible line, and vice versa.

Hence

• Countries that traditionally adhere to the hard line in the drive against terrorism negotiate and do compromises for hostages' liberation or provide any other facility (provide for safe transportation, food, medical help etc).
• Countries that are traditionally soft-liners choose the hard line...

In the case of negotiation with terrorists, the reflex approach presents a very high level of complexity. That complexity reaches its peak with the negotiation for hostages’ liberation.Therefore reflex, as it is involved in negotiation for the liberation of hostages, might serve as a paradigm in regard to the explanation of issues that are less complex – for example: negotiations that deal the occupation of buildings, the treatment of dangerous material, the setting up of conditions on the execution of political demands, the paying ransom and so on.

This said, we consider negotiations for hostages’ liberation as the most developed form of negotiations with terrorists.

, Hostages are taken for different reasons. Many of the questions dealing the negotiation’s nature are common to the various particular cases, but they should be examined subordinately to the following rationale:

Hostage taking stems from the economy of plus value, it is always aimed at profit making. Negotiation too. Hence the economic goal is relevant to both camps. Below the listing of the major “positive” target features:

• Originating a real threat to the life of innocent people within a short period of time.
• Staging the hostage taking as a highly efficient act of communication with the public opinion. At its largest extent: providing for mass-media covering and support in regard to the demands and conditions.

As for the authorities, the authorities pursue the major target features are

• keeping hostages alive
• hostage liberation
• arresting the criminals
• safeguarding material values
• preventing indesirable hard political consequences and international conflicts.

Negotiations for hostages’ liberation might be divided into three types:

1. position building of the camps, e.g. defining and checking up of reciprocal goals, convergency and differences of demands, seeking for ways of compromise;
2. evaluation of the strong and the weak aspects of the parties’ positions, by processing reference and parameters, on which the other part might come to compromise;
3. fulfilment of the negotiation’s major aims – adopt the best strategy to protect the life of people and to liberate the hostages....

Negotiations with terrorists are structured in a specific and complex manner: First of all, they present a horizontal structure in as much as they develop on the ground of the relationship and the interaction between a negotiation conductor who acts on behalf of the country or government, on the one hand, and the terrorists who have taken hostages. Within this framework demands are articulated, decisions are found out and conditions are posed. At the same time, negotiations operate in a vertical manner. This is because each part that is involved may be considered as a spokesman or a representative who acts on behalf of the authorities that provide respectively for instructions. In almost all negotiations with terrorists, both the terrorists and the police and other security forces of the attacked state, operate in accordance with the orders they receive from their respective headquarters.

The countri’s authorities must seek for opportunities which facilitate the prediction of the outcome. To reach that goal, they must demonstrate self control and confidence.. The main tactical aims at negotiations consist in gaining some time, receiving information about the terrorists and the hostages, getting in touch with the criminals and persuading them to act wisely, according to the inherent risk of conflict escalation and lose of lives...

It is abundantly clear from reflexive analysis that in the majority of the cases the negation is targeted to the following goals:

• protecting the lives of the negotiators and special forces who act on behalf of the country / keeping the hostages alive;
• liberation of the hostages;
• Liberation / exchange of imprisoned terrorists;
• providing transport vehicles, money, food and medical help to terrorists;.
• meeting other demands;
• Usually it is neither recommended to negotiate with terrorists for hostages’ exchange, nor is it convenient to provide them with, alcohol and drugs.

Indicators that favour good working negotiations are:

• A strategy that lacks in the use of force and reduces the death risk of the hostages; the guideline is “no use of force, any murderd hostages”.
• Reducing the risk of "emotional behaviour" (verbal threats towards the hostages).
• Prolonging the duration period of every upcoming conversation with the terrorists.
• Transforming negative and counter-productive emotional speech features into constructive features etc.

The most important information that should be received during the negotiations process, refers to:

• the criminals - profile, preliminary bio data, causes and aims of hostage taking, behaviour and emotional condition, type and quantity of the arms, special skills etc;
• the hostages - quality, age, sex, marks, bio data, behaviour, emotional condition, attitude towards the fact of retaining etc;
• the location of the terrorists and the hostages - positions of safe observation, possible escape ways, routes of secured draw ouit, the environment, the weather etc.
• Within this framework, some cases / situations are predisposed towards a pure and more or less objective analysis of that specific topic; ideally such an analysis does not take into account the particular aspects that ground and surround the participant’s interaction

Situation of Negotiations with Terrorists

There are good reasons to define the case of negotiation with terrorists as:

• highly problematic, because it is a sudden and an unexpectedly arising impediment in regard to the authorities’ security and safeguard commitment;;
• dangerous, because there is a big risk for incidents, e.g. high potential of life and health threat, regarding both the parties that are engaged in negotiation and the hostages ;
• unique, because of its unpredictible outcome and its wide-ranging possible damages, however the latter might be avoided, too;
• tense, because there is a real risk that the development as well as the outcome of the process impacts in a considerable manner the personality and psychological equilibrium of both the actors involved in negotiation and the hostages (for example post-traumatism).
• serious, because through lack of time for taking a responsible decision and through lack of sufficient information, the parties might act in an irrational and irreversible manner;

Under extreme circumstances stress might develop. The following stress factors are to be considered;

a) stressors of internal uncertainty; b) stressors of external uncertainty; c) stressors of subjective importance; d) stressors of of objective importance.

By “stressors of internal uncertainty” we understand the stress factors that develop through lack of clear definition regarding cognitive processes and behavioural pattern, et the level of the individual’s psychology. In other words this means that stressors of internal uncertainity develop by means of indefinable patterns insides the cocnitive and behavioural proceses of an individual. On the contrary, by “stressors of external uncertainty we understand those stress factors which develop on the ground of indefinable environmental factors outsides the indidividual’s cognitive and behavioural structure. “Stressors of subjective importance” are stress factors that stem from the subjective evaluation of the importance that a person grants to the way he / she behaves in a given situation. “Stressors of objective importance” are stress factors that derive from those factors that impact, in a decisive manner, the social, political and humanitarian context. It is important to acknowledge that the impact of all these stressors can be determined by means of empirical evidence. This assumes that bothn the stessors of subjective importance and the stressors of objective importance are to be considered as facts. He involvement of subjective evaluation in stress does not affect the objectivity of the stress situation.

• The stressors of external uncetainty are relevant to the fight and combat phase, namely then when the irreversibility of the outcome depends upon the reciprocity of the opponents’ action / reaction. In such a situation alternative options have little or no chance to develop. Of big importance are also the environmental conditions, the weather, and the place.
• The stressors of objective importance are determined by the nature of the control of the outer context and the evaluation of the activity’s consequences for the individual and fr the society....
• The stressors of internal uncertainty are related to the responsible and competent evaluation of the activity’s results and consequences...
• The subjectivel importance is determined by the nature of the subjective evaluation of the realization of the individual’s motives.

For the authorities stressors of external ambiguity and importance have absolute priority. Among the stressors of external ambiguity, the following are worthy to be mentioned: Impossibility to preview the development of situations, especially at the beginning of the negotiation, time and space limits of a conflict, insufficient information about terrorists and hostages; no or not enough time for rational decision making and objective evaluation, possibility of changes in situation under influence of casualties and unexpected circumstances etc.

Among the stressors of outer importance, the most important stems from the authority’s responsibility to appropriately evaluate the potential of hard and irreversible consequences of the actions they are tempted to realize... For the terrorists the main stressors are the external ambiguity and the inner importance. Stressors of external ambiguity are: deficit of information about a possible counter-measure of the country, attempts made in order to realize their plans and to solve problems; progressive abandon of resistance, without giving up the achievement of the aims; impossibility to preview /predict with certainty the reaction of the public opinion towards terrorists' activities etc.

Among the stressors of inner importance, as they develop on the ground of counter-measures, the main one is the choice of the tactics "va banc": either granting their demands, or a check mate (including lethal exit). From the very beginning of their operations, terrorists know very well that there will be some casualties.

As for the hostages, stressors of external ambiguity prevail, and they provoke anxiety and scepticism in regards to their real life risk..

It is abundantly clear from research that terrorist activities rarely stem exclusively and genuinely from the motivation of an individual; it is even not clear to which extent the motives of an individual might cause an act of terrorism... Even in the presence of common (social) and individual (psychological personal) peculiarities), explanations miss an «determining link", which might explain why a person commits a terrorist act. This "determining link" is called “extremist’s consciousness". It could be defined as:

• utmost intolerance towards another's opinions and evaluations;
• egocentrism;
• partial thought and the attitude that generalizes special cases and supplants the relative importance of behaviour by that of an absolute importance which, in turn, implies an absolute perception of the self;
• destructive character;/ extremely aggressive behaviour;
• amorality;
• following the principle of "the end justifies the means".

It might be argued that women shows a predisposition towards a more lightly development of such an "extremist type of personality". As an extremist woman has declared, men reach fanaticism under the yoke of their ideological background, while women reach it by being impelled by the fury of their tears. Women differ from men in as much as the former demonstrate a special bravery, daring, recklessness, even cruelty in committing acts of terrorism. That is why, in situations of negotiations with terrorists, the participation of female-terrorists is worthy of special consideration and attention.

It is important to acknowledge that in the first minutes of a conflict, terrorists are extremely exasperated and aggressive. Their major aim: Break the willingness and the free choice of hostages by means of physical violence and activities with bloody outcome. Accordingly resistance in, a beginner against an armed terrorist might lead to a spontaneous and dangerous reaction. Given the risk of escalation, both the authorities and the hostages should demonstrate composure the majority of the cases the intervention of Special Forces aimed at the liberation of the hostages can hardly be recommended. It is because such an option, if it were realized, might provoke the terrorists in a counter-productive manner and end in bloodshed/.

During the whole negotiation process with terrorists, the hostages face a very difficult and stress situation. The latter impact in a considerable manner the way they behave in order to react... A stress situation provokes, along with other reactions, a specific, social-psychological phenomenon... In due course of time the terrorists and the hostages engage in a process of reciprocal emotional dependence. This phenomenon is called the «Stockholm Syndrome". The latter, from the psychological point of view, holds the following reactions: the hostages demonstrate positive emotions towards their perpetrators; the hostages begin to demonstrate their unease with the authorities and the actors that negotiate on behalf of their country by means of negative emotions and criticism; at the same time the terrorists develop a kind of sympathy with their hostages. The “Stockholm Syndrome” develops on the ground of victims and offenders who interact under extreme stress. The rationale is a following: Each of both feel sympathy for the other as they are on the “same boat”. The interaction and interdependence is intense at the point that the activities of the authorities and the actors that behave on behalf of the hostages’ country are perceived by both, the terrorists and the hostages, as a factor that, by involving an “outsider”, might cause serious troubles to the safe shipping of the boat.

Among the factors that favour he development of the "Stockholm Syndrome» time is worthy to be considered in front. The factor time is always favourable for the development of the syndrome, at the condition that both, the hostages and the terrorists, engage in a contact and communication partnership that is lacking in negative influence and distrust. It would be an error to consider the phenomenon of the “Stockholm Syndrome” as a factor that prompts either positive or negative effects. Both are equally relevant and work at t the same time...As for the positive factor, consider: the more the syndromee is developed, the less the death risk of the hostages. N the contrary, the syndrome might work to the detriment of the reliability and objectiveness of the information that the terrorists provide to the authorities/

The Negotiating Team from the Part of the Country

The inherent psychological rationale of leading negotiations with terrorists requires negotiation leadership that must demonstrate that it is capable of satisfying complex and problematic quest and demands in an appropriate manner. For an individual person it is often difficult, sometimes impossible, to reach that goal. Under such conditions it might be preferable to involve a whole team of communication specialists, psychologists and psychiatrists in the negotiation...

. Ideally the negotiation leader / the members of the negotiation team are required to

• demonstrate reflex skills and experience in facing extreme situations;
• be absolutely convinced of the necessity of negotiations and about its constructive effects (possibility to reach by means of negotiation positive goals and to obtain good results);
• understand clearly the necessity (in case of failure) to make use of specialized armed groups for arresting the offenders;
• be experts in terrorism and to demonstrate an in-depth knowledge of the ideology and the strategy / tactics of international terrorist organizations etc;
• be experts in communication and demonstrate skill at listening to an interlocutor, at gaining confidence and coming to an agreement, at establishing contacts with different people, at impacting the psychological state of an interlocutor, and witness "emotional maturity";

: Bad negotiators lack in sufficiently developed reflexive skills; demonstrate overconfidence in the strength, power and firmness; are predisposed towards a rigorous and formal attitude towards people and communication; lack in clear communication; offer low language skills; do not demonstrate emotional maturity, do not fulfil the requirements of physical and psychological firmness etc.

Reflexive Management of Terrorists’ Behaviour

Reflexive management is aimed at the development of conditions that favour the manipulation of other people. Reflexive management is the process that constraints other people to behave in the way you want them to behave. Reflexive management is a wide platform for interaction with terrorists. Basically reflexive management develops on the ground of reciprocal reflex action, as it is central to the interaction between the authorities / representatives of a given country and the terrorists. Social cognition is a very important issue inasmuch as the level of adequacy of social cognition, on the part of the opponent, impacts the outcome of the negotiation in situations with hostage taking. A high level of social cognition works to the profit of the hostages and the negotiators / authorities a low level to their detriment. The gain is always in proportion with the level. A downright and naked lie should be avoided, because it might help developing a situation that is out of control. Instead we recommend using the strategy that lives from the maxim: “the truth, only the truth but not the complete one". In almost all cases it works to the profit of the hostages and the authorities.

Reflexive behaviour, on the part of the authorities and country representatives, is a guarantee for proportional reaction against hostages’ taking and terrorism as well as crime.

General Conclusions about the Proportional Reflex Approach in the Drive against Terrorism

1. There are two types of reflex approach in the drive against terrorism - strategic and tactical. The strategic reflex is aimed at the creation of a general concept of terror as a criminal behaviour. The tactical reflex studies the different cases of terrorists’ acts.
2. The strategic reflex defines the proportionality of official normative measures towards terrorism. A data system based on the systematic evaluation of the linkage between terrorism, religion and ethnicity might be an important component in the strategic reflex approach.
3. The tactical reflex is central to the authority’s efforts to overcome and manage complex cases of terrorism The tactic reflex approach does not only define the first measures on "hot traces"; it is also relevant for consequent decision making aimed to reduce the wide ranging repercussion of a specific terrorist attack upon politics and society.
4. The quality of strategic reflex depends on the nature of the country’s terrorism management policy. Its framework and its importance are genuinely political issues. On the contrary, the tactical reflex defines the way of how special forces shall act in order to overcoming specific terrorist acts. It is genuinely relevant for the practitioners of security (police, Amy and other security agencies)...

In the drive against terrorism, both the strategic and the tactical reflex approach shall become an inherent part of law enforcement.